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Sub-Saharan African countries’ agricultural production has accelerated in the 
twenty-first century. This study shows that aggregate African agricultural production 
exhibits a breakthrough after 2000. More specifically, agricultural production 
breakthroughs occurred in 24 sub-Saharan African countries after 2000. 15 of them were 
caused by yield improvement and 8 of them were caused by area expansion. These 
breakthroughs helped these countries meet their increasing food consumption demands 
and lower their dependency on agricultural imports. However, we also found these 
breakthroughs were fragile. In addition to the influences of recent natural disasters and 
drought, these fertilizer-enabled production accelerations might also have been negatively 
impacted by the world food crisis due largely to higher fertilizer prices from 2008 to 
2010. To understand the role of agricultural foreign aid on these breakthroughs, we 
grouped countries into four categories based on whether they experienced a breakthrough 
(Group A and B) and their reasons if they had a breakthrough. Group A1 includes 
countries that experienced breakthrough due to yield improvement and Group A2 
includes countries with breakthrough due to area expansion.
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We first quantitatively compared agricultural aid received by different groups of 
countries, and then we used instrumental variable regression, accounting for endogeneity 
in aid allocation, to estimate agricultural aid’s influence on agricultural productivity. The 
results show that agricultural aid positively affected agricultural productivity, and 
countries that realized production breakthroughs, especially those achieved via yield 
improvement, received more agricultural aid. We found a positive correlation between 
aid and TFP growth. Aid also helped countries to lower their dependency on imports. The 
international donors are playing important roles in helping sub-Saharan Africa feed itself. 
The total flow of agricultural aid should definitely increase, and more emphasis could be 
put on improving agricultural yields in recipient countries. Agricultural research has 
proven to be a promising category to which to donate, but more research is called for to 
better understand the impact of other sub-categories of agricultural aid on sub-Saharan 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The world food crisis that took place in 2007-2008 brought great attention to the 
agricultural sectors of many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
was a crisis caused by dramatically increasing global food prices. According to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the food price index 
(consisting of the average of five commodity group price indices), which represents the 
overall price of food commodities, increased from 126.7 in 2006 to 199.8 in 2008. It 
increased to a higher level of 210 in 2012 after a short decline in 2009. One group of 
commodities that led the price increases and still remained at high price levels was 
cereals, which doubled from 121.7 in 2006 to 237.8 in 2008 and 219.2 in 2013. Moreover, 
although researchers such as Wiggins and Keats (2013) and institutions like the FAO 
(2010) expect the global supplies of major food crops to be more adequate compared with 
those of 2008, they also expect food prices to remain at a higher level over the long term.   
The persistent high prices on primary cereal products raised food security and 
poverty concerns in many countries around the world, and especially in sub-Saharan 
African countries (World Bank, 2008), due to the poor performance of agriculture in 
Africa prior to 2000. Studies conducted by Ivanic and Martin (2008) confirmed that food 
price inflation could lead to greater malnutrition as well as raise overall poverty globally. 
Their calculation showed that the increase in global commodity prices resulted in an
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increase in the poverty headcount of 105 million people out of the 2.3 billion low-income 
population in all low-income countries. Based on Ivanic and Martin’s results, Wodon and 
Zaman (2008) further estimated the poverty impacts of rising food prices in sub-Saharan 
African countries and drew poverty maps for illustration. Wodon and Zaman found that 
rising food prices are likely to lead to higher poverty in sub-Saharan Africa.  
As a response to higher food prices, several policies such as food aid and labor 
intensive public works were implemented by the local governments of sub-Saharan 
African countries with support from foreign donors. Combes et al (2014) confirmed that, 
besides the effort from local governments, foreign aid could also significantly mitigate 
the impact of negative food price shocks. Hence, many donors that provide foreign aid to 
Africa have shifted their donation priorities to the agricultural sector, trying to boost 
agricultural production in order to increase food availability. From our research we 
observed that aid that going to Africa’s agricultural sector increased to a record high of 
3.2 billion US dollars (6.5% of the total aid flow to Africa) in 2010, which was double 
the 1.5 billion US dollars received in 2005 (3.2% of the total aid flow to Africa). This aid 
was used for short term programs such as food aid and safety net support, and long term 
programs, such as agricultural research projects. As Combes et al (2014) stated in their 
analysis, improving the utilization of foreign aid by removing constraining policies could 
only dampen the impact of rising food prices in the short term. To address the issue in the 
long term, African countries and the international donor community should invest to 
boost agricultural production. Thus, it becomes crucial to evaluate how much impact 
foreign aid has had on agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa. However, as we 
discuss in the following chapter, we see a prior decline of aid to agricultural during 1990s. 
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Aid to Africa fell from USD 43 billion in 1990 to USD 28 billion in 2000, while its share 
of total aid among world recipients declined from 35% to 23%. This pessimism has 
persisted for aid overall as well as aid to agricultural, which remained insufficient over 
the past years. A sad fact is that Africa’s share of aid to agricultural dropped from 10.5% 
in 1995 to 3.2% in 2005. 
We also studied the dynamics of agricultural production in sub-Saharan African 
countries in recent years. As the most feasible way to increase food availability, 
agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa has become increasingly important under 
the pressure of rising international food prices and growing demand. From a demand and 
supply perspective, the demands on agricultural supply for African countries will 
continue to increase due to increasing population (annual growth rate is 2.5%) and likely 
income growth in the future. As we can see from Figure 1, Africa’s population is growing 
rapidly, with no sign of slowing down.  
 
Figure 1. Africa’s Aggregate Population Index and Crop Production Index over 1961 to 
2010.  
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Fortunately, sub-Saharan Africa’s rate of agricultural growth has accelerated 
significantly in recent years according to Figure 1. In Figure 1, Africa’s crop production 
index growth was lower than population growth before the 1990s. Then it demonstrates 
accelerated growth since the 1990s. This is a great achievement if we compare this trend 
to the era before 1990, when Africa’s crop production stayed low and was not able to 
grow as fast as its increasing population.  
As sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural production continues to grow, it becomes 
essential to explore the factors that have driven it. Many studies have been conducted to 
determine if agricultural productivity has improved as a source of production acceleration. 
The alternative source would be land area increase. A recent study done by Fuglie and 
Rada (2013) assessed the growth of agricultural production and measured the 
performance of total factor productivity (TFP) in sub-Saharan Africa. This research found 
agricultural research, economic policy, education and irrigation to be factors that promote 
productivity, which then contribute to the increases of agricultural production growth.  
Inspired by his results and estimation methods, this study provides a more 
comprehensive analysis beyond Figure 1 to better understand the impact of total foreign 
aid flows on agricultural production. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the role of the total 
flow of foreign aid to the agricultural sector in promoting the growth of agricultural 
productivity. Thus, I try to find answers to the following two questions: 
(1) Did sub-Saharan African countries do better in agricultural production after 
2000?  If this was the case, what would be the reasons that drove that outcome? 
(2) As donors gave more foreign aid to the agricultural sector, what was the role 
of the foreign aid in promoting agricultural production growth?  
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The expected answers, or the hypotheses to test, can be stated as follow: 
 (1) Many African countries and the region overall exhibited significant growth 
acceleration (in this paper it is defined as a “breakthrough”) in agricultural production 
after 2000. In some cases this was due to area expansion, while in others it was due to 
yield improvement. 
(2) Agricultural foreign aid has recently had a positive impact on sub-Saharan 
Africa’s agricultural production.  
To verify these hypotheses, this paper comprises six chapters. Following the 
introduction is a chapter that provides an overview of sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural 
production and foreign aid received. It shows different production growth patterns that 
countries exhibited and reviews the amount, locations and purpose of foreign aid in 
Africa’s agricultural development. Following Chapter 2 is a literature review focusing on 
research explaining aid effectiveness, factors that could impact agricultural productivity, 
and TFP estimation methods. 
Chapter 4 identifies the year of grain production breakthroughs in sub-Saharan 
countries after 2000. We found that 24 sub-Saharan African countries had production 
breakthroughs, with 15 of them achieved via yield improvement and 8 of them via area 
expansion. We also examined effects on supply, use and trade of cereal products after 
these breakthroughs. 
Chapter 5 explores the role of foreign aid in affecting agricultural productivity in 
Africa. We first compared aid received and agricultural GDP growth of different country 
groups. Then we estimated the agricultural TFP growth rate and the impact of agricultural 
aid growth on annual TFP growth. We found that when countries received more aid, they 
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usually tended to have higher TFP growth simultaneously. Secondly, we found that 
agricultural foreign aid had a positive effect on the agricultural TFP growth of sub-
Saharan African countries after 2000. Chapter 6 presents our conclusions, and the 
implications of these results.
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION AND FOREIGN AID 
2.1 History of Agricultural Production in Africa 
Researchers (e.g. Shapouri and Rosen, 1999) historically identified sub-Saharan 
Africa as the most food-insecure region in the world. For places in Africa where what 
people ate was what they grew, one possible reason for food scarcity was the slow rate of 
food production growth that failed to keep up with the rate of population growth. As a 
group, African countries suffered for a long period when agricultural production was 
unable to grow at the same speed as population growth. This was clearly illustrated in 
Figure 1, which showed aggregate crop production growth and population growth of 
Africa. According to Figure 1, Africa experienced a slowdown in crop production growth 
from1973 to 1990. Despite various political reasons behind this trend, the trend itself may 
partially illustrate why people were deeply concerned about Africa’s food security around 
2001 (Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). To better understand what happened in sub-Saharan 
African over the last 50 years, we can examine agricultural production at the country 
level, and then compare it with the population growth trend to identify when and where 
this food security issues occurred. Figure 2 shows the comparison we made on the 




These countries were selected based on the criterion of population size. Table 1 
lists the 14 most populous African countries, showing these 14 countries’ population size 
and their accumulated percentages over the total population of sub-Saharan African 
countries. We can see from the table that the population in total of these 14 countries 
represents 75% of the total population in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, they were selected as 
representatives of sub-Saharan African countries.  
Table 1 Most populated 14 sub-Saharan African Countries Ranked by 2012 Population 
size  
Rank Country Cumulated % of Sub-Saharan Africa's Total Population 
Population 
(Millions) 
1 Nigeria 19% 169 
2 Ethiopia 29% 92 
3 Congo, Dem. Rep. 36% 66 
4 South Africa 42% 51 
5 Tanzania 47% 48 
6 Kenya 52% 43 
7 Sudan 56% 37 
8 Uganda 60% 36 
9 Ghana 63% 25 
10 Mozambique 66% 25 
11 Madagascar 68% 22 
12 Cameroon 71% 22 
13 Angola 73% 21 
14 Cote d'Ivoire 75% 20 




















































































































































































































































































South Africa: Growth Rates 
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Uganda: Growth Rates 
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Cameroon: Growth Rates 
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Figure 2 Continued. 
Source: World Bank, Database of Africa Development Indicators. 2014 
The left side of Figure 2 shows the relation between the crop production index 
(2004-2006 = 100) and the population index (2004-2006 = 100) in selected sub-Saharan 
countries. The base year of these indexes is the average value of production or population 
from 2004 to 2006, which is set as 100 to make this index. To better understand the 
changing of trends, the right side of Figure 2 shows the moving average compound 
growth rate of crop production and of population for selected sub-Saharan countries using 
three years as an interval to smooth volatility. The compound growth rate is calculated 
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Cote d'Ivoire: Growth Rates 
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between year one and year four is three, we take the cube root of the fraction. Finally, this 
result minus one becomes the compound growth rate on each three year interval.   
We could classify these countries into four categories based on the variations of 
crop production and compound growth rates, as described below:  
1. Sub-Saharan African countries that have exhibited the ability to sustain food 
self-sufficiency: Ethiopia, Kenya and Cameroon. Their population follows a smooth 
natural growth pattern with a consistent growth rate. At the same time, their crop 
production growth rates are generally the same as if not higher than the population 
growth rate during the entire period from 1961 to 2009. For Ethiopia, since crop 
production data from 1981 to 1992 are unavailable from the World Bank database. We 
could only examine the existing data after 1992. It shows that crop production grew much 
faster (5.4% annual average) than population growth (2.9% annual average).  
2. Sub-Saharan African countries whose crop production failed or hardly grew 
with population growth: Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nigeria has 
the largest population in Africa (Table 1: 16% of Africa’s total population) and it 
continues to grow smoothly. However, its crop production growth was much slower than 
population growth for a long time. In 1986 Nigeria’s crop production started to speed up 
and reached its peak in 2006, but after that it grew at a negative rate. The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo is another example of failed production growth. It is the only 
country in Africa whose steady crop production growth rate was interrupted, decreasing 
sharply starting in 1993.  
3. Sub-Saharan African countries that experienced a lag in crop production 
growth compared with population growth at one period, after which crop production 
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growth caught up again. These countries are Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique, 
Madagascar and Angola. More specifically, Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar 
showed similar growth pattern. They managed their crop production well in the 1960s, 
and then growth stopped in the 1970s. Crop production finally started to catch up again in 
the 1990s (Mozambique) and the 2000s (Angola, Madagascar and Tanzania). For Uganda 
and Ghana, the slowdown happened in the 1980s, after which their crop production 
generally maintained a steady and positive growth. 
4. Sub-Saharan African countries for which it is hard to determine if crop 
production growth kept up with population growth or not: South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Sudan. South Africa has a varying crop production growth rate curve over time. 
During the early 1990s it went down to negative. In recent years, however, the 
fluctuations decreased and South Africa experienced a low and sometimes negative 
growth rate. However, although the crop production growth is decreasing, given its 
decelerated population growth, it is too early to conclude that South Africa cannot 
maintain its crop production growth with its population growth. Sudan is an example of 
how armed conflict might impact agricultural production. Before 2004, Sudan frequently 
enjoyed a high crop production growth rates, but after that the growth rate slowed down 
and eventually dropped to negative. Most recently (2011) we see a resumption of the 
positive trend, but it is also too early to determine if Sudan can restore its high crop 
production growth rate. Cote d’Ivoire generally sustained a downward positive crop 
production growth trend all the time except in 2003 and 2009. What makes Cote d’Ivoire 
unique is that its growth rate fluctuates significantly. Given its high and decreasing 
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population growth trend over the same period, it is also too early to determine if 
production growth could keep up with population growth.  
Categories 1 and 3 indicate that 9 out of 14 heavily populated sub-Saharan 
African countries are currently experiencing the situation in which crop production 
growth is faster than population growth. In terms of food safety, this is a good signal. In 
addition to this relatively simple review based on the figures, we will further explore in 
Chapter 4 which countries recently experienced good performance on agricultural 
production, and why. 
2.2 Role of Foreign Aid in Africa’s Agricultural Development 
2.2.1 Descriptive Information on Foreign Aid 
This section features descriptive information about foreign aids including sources 
of aid, definition of aid and classifications of aid. Most of the data used here are from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD/DAC), which publishes a comprehensive dataset called the Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS). It is a database that continuously gathers information on aid 
flows from various donors to international recipients. This database does not now publish 
records on aid to the agricultural sector before 1995, as well as aid from multilateral 
donors before 1995. Therefore, the analysis here will be based on the available data 
starting from 1995. The unit of all data is US dollars (USD), using 2011 constant prices 
to adjust for inflation. 
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Aid going to developing countries can be classified into private and official 
donations. The amount from private donors has increased significantly in recent years. 
For example, from 2002 to 2007, private aid increased from USD 22 billion to USD 364 
billion (OECD, 2013). However, despite the large amount of private aid going to 
developing countries, little goes to the agricultural sector each year according to the 
OECD dataset. Thus, private aid is beyond the scope of our discussion and we will focus 
on official giving instead. 
Official giving includes official development assistance (ODA), official aid (OA) 
and other official flows (OOF). ODA refers to the development aid provided to 
developing countries; whereas OA refers to development aid provided to developed 
countries. OOF covers the transactions that do not meet the condition of aid, “either 
because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a Grant 
Element of less than 25 per cent” according to the OECD’s definition (OECD, 2013). 
Examples are export credits and equity investment. OOF does not fall into the range of 
our discussion. More importantly, the amount of ODA is always much greater than the 
other two types of aid according to historical records (OECD, 2013). Because most 
African countries are developing countries, this paper uses ODA data to measure foreign 
aid going to agriculture in Africa. 
In the OECD database, the aid information includes both aid commitments and 
aid disbursements. Aid commitments are often larger than aid disbursements, and there is 
a time lag between commitments and disbursements. According to Islam (2011), the 
economic reforms that took place in many African countries during the 1990s reduced 
government capacity, hindering the implementation of ODA projects. This slowed down 
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the speed of meeting commitments, thus enlarging the gap between commitments and 
disbursements. In fact, many commitments were never met, as pointed out by Hearn 
(2010) and Islam (2011). This gap together with inflation made each year’s aid 
disbursement smaller than its aid commitment (Figure 3). In the worst-case scenario, if a 
significant difference between aid commitments and aid disbursements occurred across 
countries, this analysis could even become inaccurate or misleading. Aid commitment 
data since 1995 are provided, but aid disbursement data are provided only since 2002. 
Using commitment data rather than disbursement data would guarantee a larger sample 
size and a longer time series. Thus, below I will use commitment data under most 
circumstances, although the possible consequences of using aid commitment data is that 
the analysis would become less close to reality. 
 
Figure 3 Commitments and Gross Disbursements of Agricultural ODA Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa. (Millions of Constant 2011 USD) 















2.2.2 Amount of Aid Going to Africa’s Agricultural Sector 
In 2011, bilateral donors (DAC member countries and non-member countries 
combined) disbursed 64% of the total net ODA amount to all sectors (USD 33 billion), 
whereas multilateral donors disbursed the other (36%) of the total amount to all sectors 
(USD 18 billion) to African recipients.  
The disbursement/commitment rate was 91% (total), 97 % (bilateral) and 82% 
(multilateral) in 2011. The total disbursements of USD 51 billion that went to Africa 
accounted for 29% of total disbursements to all recipients (OECD, 2013). 
Figure 4 illustrates the trend of the share of aid to all sectors received by Africa 
(all recipients) from 1960 to 2011. From 1960 to 1972, the general aid amount that went 
to Africa stayed at around USD 12 billion per year and the share of aid received by 
Africa among total aid declined year over year. In 1960, it was 37%, then it dropped to 19% 
in 1972, which implies that aid to other regions increased during that period. From 1973, 
Africa started to draw the attention of donors again and attracted more and more aid until 
1990, with a small valley in 1980. General aid reached its historical peak at USD 43 
billion in 1990, almost quadrupled compared with 1972, and was 35% of the total aid to 
all recipients that year. During the 1990s, the importance of Africa in total ODA projects 
declined again. The 1990s to the early 2000s was a period when both aid to all 
developing recipients and aid to Africa remained at its lowest level. According to 
Binswanger and McCalla (2010), the end of the cold war reduced the competitive 
pressure to expand aid, so the support levels fell globally. Aid to Africa fell to USD 25 
billion in 2000, with its share of total aid declining to 23%. From 2001, global donors 
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refocused on Africa and increased the amount of general aid that went to Africa every 
year until 2011. The share of aid to Africa reached another peak (32%) in 2006 with the 
amount in that year doubling compared with 2001. Aid was reduced temporarily in 2007 
and 2008, possibly due to the world financial crisis, and then resumed to the 2006 
standard in 2009. The share shrunk to 29% in 2011, showing that donors increased aid 
amounts to other regions as well in response to the crisis. On average, over the last 50 
years Africa took 29% of total aid assigned to all recipients. This indicates that Africa 
always had about one third of the global attention over ODA distribution. 
Figure 4 Trend In General Aid Disbursed to Africa and its Share over Aid Disbursed to 
Global Recipients. (Billions of Constant 2011 USD) 




In Africa, aid going to the agricultural sector is only a small portion of total aid. 
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from 1995 to 2005, and refocused on it after 2005. Figure 5 shows the trend in aid to 
Africa’s agricultural sector from 1995 to 2011. One line is the percentage of aid to the 
agricultural sector. It indicates how important the agricultural sector is to donors. The 
more attention that goes to the agricultural sector, the more the share of aid that goes to 
the sector. This figure can be divided into two periods: 1995 to 2005 and 2006 to 2011. 
During the first period (1995-2005), the aid amount distributed to the agricultural sector 
stayed low, with the average at USD 1.5 billion per year. Africa entered the “doldrums” 
period according to Chimhowu (2013), when multiple factors from both the donor’s and 
the recipient’s sides jointly took effect and reduced the investment of aid to agriculture in 
Africa. According to Islam (2011), the possible reasons why aid to the agricultural sector 
decreased continuously might include lags and the gap between commitment and 
disbursement, shifting interests of donor countries, and low priority from recipient 
countries. This is illustrated by the declining share of aid to the agricultural sector over 
this period, which dropped from 10.4% (1995) to 3.2% (2005). 2005 to 2011 was the 
second period, when both the aid amount and share of aid to the agricultural sector 
increased. 2005 to 2007 was the time when aid to Africa’s agricultural sector grew faster 
than total aid to Africa, so the share increased too. 2007-2009 was when aid to Africa’s 
agricultural sector and total aid to Africa grew at the same speed, so the share remained at 
5.2% for three years. In 2010, total aid to Africa stopped growing but aid to Africa’s 
agricultural sector continuously increased, so the share increased again.  
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Figure 5 Trend In Net Amount of Aid to African’s Agricultural Sector, And Its 
Percentage over Total Aid Flow (%). 
Source: OECD CRS Aid Activity database (2013)                                                                          
 
Because Figure 5 represents the overall trend for Africa, individual countries in 
Africa would tend to follow a similar pattern. Aid to the agricultural sector in most 
African countries decreased from 1995 to 2005 and increased again from 2005 to 2011. 
The actual trend would vary due to specific situations in each country. For example, 
countries like Ethiopia exhibit the same trend as the overall trend for Africa. Aid to 
Ethiopia’s agricultural sector was USD 252 million in 1995, accounting for 25.8% of the 
total aid it received that year. It then decreased to USD 59 million in 2005 (2.4% of total 
aid received) and increased to USD 165 million in 2011 (5.8% of total aid received). On 
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like Tanzania reached a peak in 2005. However, this deviation from trend in some 
countries would not affect the conclusion, because the regional distribution of aid to the 
agricultural sector in Africa was imbalanced. The majority of agricultural sector aid went 
to only a small group of countries. Below we discuss the regional distribution of foreign 
aid to see which group of countries received most of the aid, especially agricultural aid. 
2.2.3 African Regions Receiving the Most Foreign Aid to the Agricultural Sector 
The distribution of foreign aid to the agricultural sector in Africa is imbalanced 
and concentrated in several large countries. To see who these countries are, an analysis 
could be conducted at the country-year level or project-level.  
The country-year level analysis involves listing and comparing the total amount 
of agricultural foreign aid that went to each recipient country for each year. One 
disadvantage of this method is that no single distribution rule can be found because of the 
large number of donors and changing projects. There are 24 bilateral (DAC country) 
donors and 31 multilateral donors. These donors had their own aid projects and could 
change their distribution plan at any time. As so many aid projects went on separately, 
one country could receive a considerable amount of aid in one year and then receive little 
another year. For example, in1995 Cote d’Ivoire received USD 341 million in aid to the 
agricultural sector from all donors (OECD CRS dataset, 2013), making it the top 
recipient country in Africa that year. It received only USD 60 million aids in 2011. In 
2011, the top recipient was Sudan, which received USD 290 million in aid to the 




Table 2 Countries That Received the Most Aid to the Agricultural Sector Each Year in 
Africa, Commitment (2010 Constant Prices) 
Year Country Aid to Agriculture  (USD Millions) Year Country 
Aid to Agriculture 
 (USD Millions) 
1995 Cote d'Ivoire 341 2004 Ghana 177 
1996 Tunisia 341 2005 Tanzania 240 
1997 Egypt 136 2006 Kenya 208 
1998 Ethiopia 222 2007 Mali 350 
1999 Egypt 217 2008 Morocco 377 
2000 Mali 173 2009 Mali 306 
2001 Madagascar 188 2010 Kenya 368 
2002 Cote d'Ivoire 174 2011 Sudan 290 
2003 Tanzania 153 2012 - - 
Source: OECD CRS Aid Activity database (2013) 
 
Table 2 shows that, during last 17 years, 11 countries became the top recipients. 
The country that received the most aid was changing all the time. One explanation for 
this is that the preference of donors could change due to the urgency of a particular 
country and the macro environment of that year. Another explanation is that many aid 
projects last for several years so the aid committed to these projects was intend to last for 
several years, as well. This lag in aid implementation also partially explains the 
inaccuracy of aid effectiveness analysis in chapter 5. So the attempt to find the most 
aided regions based on country level analysis becomes less effective, as the aid priority 
may change all the time. It requires further research to determine why this list changes 
year after year, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. Overall, the results in Table 2 
indicate that the top recipient country is quite different each year. Thus, it is extremely 
hard to come to any conclusion on which group of countries received the most aid using 
country-year level analysis. 
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As country-year level analysis does not seem effective, we also conducted 
project-level analysis. Findley, Powell, Strandow and Tanner (2011) explored the 
relationship between violent armed conflict and foreign aid to Africa. They introduced 
the geo-coding method as well as new data containing geographical location information 
for foreign aid projects in Africa. This enabled me to investigate the regional distribution 
of certain agricultural foreign aid at the project-level. 
Applying their method to foreign aid projects in the agricultural sector, we came 
up with Figure 6, which is an African map showing the distribution of agricultural 
foreign aid projects. This map contains only projects that have geographical information, 
including both active World Bank projects and active African Development Bank 
projects. Unlike bilateral donors that often provide conditional aid based on domestic 
preference, one big advantage of using data from these multilateral donors is that the 
distribution of their projects would less likely be affected by political constraints. Thus, 
the distribution map of multilateral aid projects would more likely represent the overall 
regional distribution trend in the Africa.  
Data on World Bank projects data are based on the World Bank Mapping for 
Results dataset (2011), which contains 1351 active agricultural projects approved from 
1990 to 2011. Data from the African Development Bank projects are based on the 
Aiddata dataset (2011) of its approved projects in 2009 and 2010, which contains 186 
agricultural projects. In Figure 6, a light circle indicates a World Bank project, whereas a 
dark triangle indicates an African Development Bank project. The size of these indicators 
is classified into three levels by ArcGIS automatically, showing the different amount of 
aid for each project. As a reference, the population density information is also shown on 
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the map, using Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESEN) 
population data from the ESRI database (2013). It is presented using a darkness scale. 
The darker an area is, the higher its population density is. This population density map is 




Figure 6 Agricultural Sector Foreign Aid Projects in Africa on a Map Showing 
Population Density. (Projects Supported By the World Bank and African Development 
Bank)  
Source: aiddata.org. From Findley, Powell, Strandow, & Tanner (2011).  
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We can see from Figure 6 that the World Bank provided the majority of 
agricultural aid projects compared with the African Development Bank. The top foreign 
aid project recipient was Nigeria, with 304 active projects in the agricultural sector in 
2011. It also received the largest amount of aid among African countries. This is not 
surprising, as Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. Because countries in 
western-Africa accounted for around 35% of grain production in Africa, they are among 
the most important crop producers in Africa. This helps explain the concentration of the 
agricultural aid projects in Nigeria, Benin (52 projects), Mali (74 projects), Senegal (40 
projects) and Guinea (37 projects). Africa’s second important recipient is Ethiopia. It has 
more than 90 projects within its borders. It is the second most populous country and also 
an important food producer. Other countries in eastern-Africa also received a great 
amount of aid for their agricultural sectors. Kenya and Tanzania had 91 and 87 foreign 
aid projects respectively. Uganda had not only 47 World Bank aid projects but also 19 
African Development Bank projects. Considering its small land area, Uganda might be 
the country with the most concentrated agricultural foreign funded projects. North Africa 
is another region that attracts foreign aid. Egypt and Tunisia had 68 and 59 foreign aid 
agricultural projects, respectively. Most of the agricultural aid projects in Egypt are 
located along the Nile River.  
Within the country’s border, we can see that agricultural aid projects are typically 
located in the most populous areas in one country, such as coastal areas, river basins and 
capital city regions. For instance, many projects for Tanzania are located along the Indian 
Ocean coast, and many projects for Kenya are located along the lakeshore of Lake 
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Victoria. Taking the population density scale into consideration, we can see these are the 
regions that have the largest population. 
Although Figure 6 is a simple map showing only the locations of projects from 
the African Development Bank and the World Bank, the distribution of their agricultural 
foreign aid projects follows some principles. First, such projects are concentrated in 
countries with large population and large crop production. For example, Nigeria, which 
has the densest project layout, is the most populous country in Africa (see Table 1). On 
average, it produced 20.5% of the total cereal crop in Africa from 1960 to 2013 (USDA, 
2013). Second, such projects are allocated to areas based on population density. This 
corresponds with the findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000), who demonstrated that 
bilateral total aid is influenced by the donor’s strategic interest and multilateral aid is 
largely a function of income level, population, and good policy. 
However, many more foreign aid projects provided by other bilateral and 
multilateral donors did not contain geocoding information such as latitudes and 
longitudes. Because of that, further project-level analysis for this part of foreign aid 
becomes infeasible.  
2.2.4 Agricultural Sub-Categories Receiving the Most Foreign Aid to the Agricultural 
Sector 
According to the OECD (2013), foreign aid projects to the agricultural sector can 
be classified into 17 sub-categories based on their different purposes. This part reviews 
some sub-categories that received the most foreign aid.  
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The flow of agricultural aid to each agricultural sub- category was unbalanced 
annually. Thus, these sub- categories are sorted using the total amount received over the 
last 17 years (1995 to 2011). Figure 7 presents the five largest sub- categories targeted by 
foreign aid programs. These are presented together with their yearly (1995- 2011) 
amounts of aid flow. From 1995 to 2011, these five sub- categories together covered 74 % 
of the total aid to Africa’s agricultural sector, whereas the other 12 sub- categories 
received USD 9 billion aid during the last 17 years, accounting for only 26% of the total 
aid to agriculture. 
 
Figure 7  Sub- Category Allocation of Foreign Aid to SSA’s Agricultural Sector. 
Commitment, Constant Price (2011 USD Million).  


























































































The details of these five sub- categories shown in Figure 7 are listed below:  
Agricultural development, the top sub- category of agricultural aid to sub-Saharan 
Africa, includes two categories by OECD definitions: agricultural development aid and 
food crop production aid. OECD agricultural development aid was used by OECD to 
define aid that includes integrated projects and farm development. Aid to food crops 
production that includes grains, vegetable, fruit, horticulture and berries received USD 
2,146 million or 7% of total aid over the last 17 years. This new agricultural development 
category received USD 9,359 million and on average accounted for 30% of aid to the 
agricultural sector from 1995 to 2011. It was the most funded sub-category in 2002-2004, 
2006 and 2009-2011.  
Agricultural Policy & Administration Management: is defined as “Agricultural 
sector policy, planning and programs; aid to agricultural ministries; institution capacity 
building and advice; unspecified agriculture” by the OECD (2013). This category 
received USD 6,344 million and on average accounted for 20% of aid to the agricultural 
sector from 1995 to 2011. Many research studies have shown the importance of favorable 
policy in increasing crop production, efficiency in input use and resource allocation. Yu 
and Nin Pratt (2011) found that fiscal, trade and sectoral policies are very important in 
improving agricultural performance.  
Agricultural water resources: includes “irrigation, reservoirs, hydraulic structures 
and ground water exploitation for agricultural use” (OECD, 2013). Agricultural water 
resources sectors were heavily aided (largest amount of aid received in 1996), with USD 
3255 million received or 10% of total aid over the last 17 years. This reflects the 
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importance of easy access to water to increase agricultural production as well the 
underdevelopment of irrigation in Africa.  
Agricultural research refers to: “Plant breeding, physiology, genetic resources, 
ecology, taxonomy, disease control, agricultural bio-technology and livestock research” 
according to the definition from the OECD (2013). This sub-category received USD 
2,237 million or 7% of total aid over the last 17 years.  A great amount of literatures can 
be found on measuring the effectiveness of aid to agricultural research, which we will 
discuss more in the literature review chapter. 
Agricultural inputs: are defined as “Supply of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery/equipment” by the OECD (2013). In the following chapter, we will see 
increasing fertilizer usage played an important role in stimulating agricultural production. 
This category had similar priority as agricultural development in 1995-1997 but became 
less important afterwards. It received USD 1,850 million or 6% of total aid over the last 
17 years. We also see a trend of implementing agricultural input subsidies policies 
(particularly on fertilizer) in many African countries such as Malawi and Nigeria in 
recent years. 
2.2.5 Summary 
Based on the analysis in sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, we can see that the flow of 
agricultural foreign aid to sub-Saharan African countries is unstable and unbalanced. 
Over time, foreign aid to Africa grew fast until 1990. It dropped to a low level in the 
1990s, and started to increase again after 2000. From 1995 to 2005, agricultural foreign 
aid received even lower priority. In 2006 the amount of aid that went to the agricultural 
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sector started to rebound. From a location perspective, most of the projects run by the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank were concentrated in a few countries 
that have large populations and agricultural production. These included some of the most 
populous sub-Saharan African countries, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, also some mid-
size countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. From the sub-category perspective, 
agricultural aid to agricultural development and water resources increased significantly in 
recent years. At the same time, aid-funded agricultural research remained stable. Despite 
the complex structure of agricultural foreign aid flow to sub-Saharan Africa countries, we 
try to focus more on the influence of total agricultural foreign aid flow on agriculture, 
especially on agricultural productivity, which we will examine below.
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review chapter contains five parts. The first part reviews past 
studies on agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa. The second part reviews the 
methodology to identify the breakpoints of agricultural production. The third part reviews 
aid effectiveness literature that focused on the influence of general foreign aid on 
economic growth. We also discuss literature focused on the influence of agricultural aid 
on agricultural production. In the fourth part, we review the impact of agricultural aid on 
agricultural productivity and discuss two sub-categories of aid (agricultural research and 
policy aid) that attracted researchers’ attention.  The last part discusses typical methods to 
estimate TFP, because we use similar methods to estimate agricultural TFP growth in the 
following chapter. 
3.1 Agricultural Production in sub-Saharan Africa 
For a long time, sub-Saharan Africa was viewed as the most vulnerable region 
with respect to food security. At around 2000, this perspective was typical among many 
researchers, such as Shapouri and Rosen (1999) or Clover (2003). Their arguments were 
based on the increasing gap between food consumption and supply due to the rapidly 
growing population in sub-Saharan African countries. However, in the recent decade 
there was optimism about sub-Saharan Africa’s ability to rapidly increase its agricultural
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productivity and to achieve better food security. According to Sanchez et. al (2009), 
400,000 people in 80 sample Millennium Villages over ten countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa have drastically increased their staple food production and turned food deficits 
into surpluses. This so-called “African Green Revolution” was the result of mutual 
effects from scientific advancement in agricultural research, good governance, right 
policies and many other supports.  
This trend was also revealed in other studies. For example, recently there are four 
“Developmental Regimes in Africa (DRA)” project report papers focusing on the four 
African case-study countries: Nigeria (Akinyoade et al, 2013), Uganda (Leliveld et al, 
2013), Kenya (Dietz et al, 2014) and Tanzania (Leliveld et al, 2013). Although their 
research was solely focused on individual countries, their reports also argued that some 
African countries’ agricultural sectors had major breakthroughs after 2000 and are 
experiencing an “agricultural revolution”.  
Most importantly, Abbott (2012) argued that following the 2007–08 food crises, 
sub-Saharan Africa was an excellent performer and distinguished itself from other 
regions like South Asia. Its growth in grain production was 6.2 percent in 2008, 4.1 
percent in 2009 and 10.1 percent in 2010.  
In summary, this new trend of grain production acceleration in sub-Saharan 
African countries discussed in these studies, together with our own results from the 
previous chapters, served as the foundation of our analysis.  
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3.2 Identify the Breakpoint of Agricultural Production 
As discussed above, we observed increasing agricultural production and 
agricultural foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa after 2000. To find the time of this 
breakthrough, we employed a piecewise regression model. It is based on the study by 
Toms and Lesperance (2003). This model was originally used to find critical thresholds 
in ecological processes, such as the threshold of an endangered species’ population size 
that enables it to survive in the natural environment. Once an abrupt change took place 
and this threshold was broken, the chances of survival dropped dramatically. In our case, 
production could reach one “breakpoint” when the production increase exceeds the 
threshold, thus breaking through from the original trend. The “breakpoint” is the point 
where the slope of the trend line changes significantly, like one stick broken into two 
parts. The slope represents the growth rate of one of the indicators. Using annual data on 
production, yield or area harvested, we can build a piecewise regression model in 
following chapter. 
3.3 Aid Effectiveness 
The literature on the impact of foreign aid on growth is called the aid 
effectiveness literature. According to the meta-study conducted by Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2008), there are more than 100 aid effectiveness studies. Despite the large 
number of these studies, the results are multi-facetted and inconclusive. Some studies or 
researchers found that aid is ineffective. For example, Doucouliagos and Paldam’s (2008) 
used meta-analysis to find that aid has a small positive but insignificant impact on growth, 
which means aid failed to reach its goal of generating more rapid development. On the 
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other side, their study received criticism from researchers who believe that the effect of 
aid on growth is positive and statistically significant, including Mekasha and Tarp (2013). 
Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) also argued that there is no micro–macro paradox for aid 
and aid can be shown to be effective at both levels. The micro–macro paradox was first 
labeled by Mosley (1987), because he argued that while aid seems to be effective at the 
microeconomic level, any positive aggregate impact of aid is much harder to identify. 
Despite the debate at the meta-analysis level, we will instead focus more on studies 
relevant to agriculture level. We will discuss some representative papers that assess aid 
effectiveness on general growth or TFP growth, and the methodologies they used. 
Just like the meta-analysis’ results, some studies claimed that aid’s impact is 
negative. Alvi and Senbeta (2012) used ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions and 
fixed-effects instrumental variable (IV) method to analyze the relationship between 
foreign aid and general TFP. They derived general TFP growth from an aggregate 
production function and their study focused on a panel data set from 62 countries across 
the world over the period 1970-2004. Using OLS and instrumental variable (IV) 
regression to estimate the effect of aid on physical capital accumulation and TFP growth, 
their results show that while foreign aid has a positive effect on capital accumulation; it 
has a negative effect on TFP growth. The external instruments they used in IV regression 
for foreign aid are income per capita, population size and regional dummy variables, 
following other aid effectiveness studies. According to Alvi and Senbeta (2012), more aid 
would distort the efficiency of financial institutions, because the relaxed budget 
constraints would encourage them to finance more of the less efficient projects, which 
would reduce the overall effects of aid on growth. 
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For Africa, Black (2008) applied OLS regressions to analyze foreign aid’s impact 
on TFP growth for 43 African countries over the period 1975-2001. He concluded that 
aid has a negative effect on TFP growth as well as overall growth. He further argued that 
foreign aid could have a positive effect on TFP if the country has strong institutions, 
which are rare in sub-Saharan Africa.   
Some other researchers believe aid has had little impact on growth such as 
Burnside and Dollar (2000). They focus on the role of policy in affecting aid 
effectiveness. They have explored the relationship between general aid and GDP growth 
in sub-Saharan Africa using OLS and IV regressions. The instrumental variables in IV 
regression that they used for the predicted aid value included policy, arms imports, log 
population and their combinations. They found that aid has no significant impact on GDP 
growth using both OLS regression and IV regression. 
On the contrary, other researchers such as Hansen and Tarp (2001) believe that 
aid has had a positive impact on growth. Hansen and Tarp (2001) conducted regression 
using annual GDP per capita growth as dependent variable. They estimated the effect of 
independent variables including not only aid and policy but also human capital. Hansen 
and Tarp (2001) further improved these variables by using their lagged value as 
instruments. From their results, they claimed that there is a positive relationship between 
general aid and GDP growth, although their results were sensitive to estimator and 
control variables selected.  
As many researchers have pointed out, the OLS method had certain disadvantages 
on assessing aid effectiveness. The primary concern is the endogeneity of foreign aid to 
growth. That is, foreign aid is correlated with the equation’s error term. This problem is 
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caused by the possibility that aid was donated largely to countries that performed 
extremely poorly, or experienced some natural disasters, thus creating a spurious 
correlation between aid and low growth. To address this problem, many researchers used 
instruments that must be exogenous to growth to explain aid flows. Usually the 
instrumental variables are a set of variables that explained donor’s allocation decision. 
Frot and Perrotta (2010) claimed that there is little to learn from regressions where aid is 
not instrumented because of the endogeneity of general aid. Some typical methods 
include IV methods and system GMM methods. The system GMM method uses all 
variable lagged values as instruments, while two stage least square (2SLS) method 
requires a full model and uses exclusion restrictions to set instruments. 
The choice of instrumental variables for foreign aid has always been a 
controversial topic. In the general aid effectiveness studies, many variables had been used 
as instrumental variables, such as lagged aid variables or dummy variables related to 
donor or recipient country features. However, many of them have been criticized as 
inappropriate. For example, Bazzi and Clemens (2009) argue that many strong 
instrumented variables are invalid, because they are used as instrumented variables in 
multiple studies examining different topics. In other words, if an instrumental variable is 
strong and valid in one study, it would become invalid in all other studies. Because these 
studies did not include other studies’ endogenous variables as regressors, they would 
leave other endogenous variables in the error term. Thus, these instrumented variables are 
very likely to be correlated with the error term, which made them invalid.  
Moving past the controversy on correlation between foreign aid and general 
economic growth, we will concentrate our attention on a more relevant topic: the 
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effectiveness of agricultural foreign aid on agricultural production. We found two studies 
that claim a positive impact of agricultural foreign aid on agricultural production.  
The World Bank report by Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) (2011) provided 
a comprehensive view on how the aid from the World Bank could positively benefit 
agricultural productivity growth around the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. In its 
report, the IEG recognized that low agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is 
caused by numerous reasons. They listed limited access to modern inputs, irrigation, 
communication, and transport as constraints. After reviewing World Bank and 
International Finance Corporation’s strategy, activities and consequences on promoting 
agricultural productivity, IEG explained how the World Bank can alleviate these 
constraints by providing support to agricultural growth.  
Umbadda and Elgizouli (2013) reviewed the share of aid earmarked for 
agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa and came up with a conclusion that aid remained low 
around 1981-2001 and began to resume after the 2007-08 world food crisis. From a 
country perspective, using Sudan as an example, they claimed that foreign aid provided 
by the Sudan National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA) had successfully 
promoted agricultural productivity in many regions. 
These analyses generally used total agricultural aid as the research subject. In 
addition, we also see papers discussing the impact of aid that considered different sub-
categories of aid donations. They are reviewed below. 
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3.4 Impact of Agricultural Aid on Agricultural Productivity: Sub-categories 
Over the years, researchers have conducted several studies to explore the impact 
of different sub-categories’ agricultural foreign aid on agricultural productivity in Africa. 
Some of the most discussed sub-categories are agricultural research and agricultural 
policies.  
3.4.1 Agricultural Research 
As we can see from Figure 7, foreign aid aimed at funding agricultural research 
remained low (only about 1% of total aid to agriculture according to OECD(2013)) in the 
1990s and on average accounted for 7% of total aid to agriculture from 1995 to 2011. 
Binswanger and McCalla (2010) believe that the diminishing amount of aid to 
agricultural research was due to the increasing number of armed conflicts in Africa 
during the 1990s. This urged donors to shift their priority to short run aid, although 
studies consistently showed that returns from investing in agricultural research are higher. 
For example, Block (2010) concluded that during the period 1981-2010, doubling the 
research expenditure in one year could substantially increase the output per worker, by 20% 
ten years later. Block claimed that agricultural research expenditures were responsible for 
75% of estimated TFP growth. 
Fuglie and Rada (2013) examined the relationship between agricultural research 
investment and agricultural TFP using data from the Consultative Group for International 
Agricultural Research centers (CGIAR). The results from their TFP estimation showed 
the four most effective factors behind agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa to 
be as follows: (1) elimination of policy bias, which could increase TFP by 4.7% 
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immediately; (2) doubling of the investment in international agricultural research, which 
would increase TFP by 4.1% (overall) over two decades; (3) doubling of the investment 
in national agricultural research, which would increase TFP by 3.7% (overall) over two 
decades; and (4) doubling of the irrigation area, which would increase TFP by 2.9% 
(overall). (2) and (3) showed that foreign aid could affect the production function by 
investing in agricultural research. Fuglie and Rada (2013) argue that international and 
national investments in agricultural research are the most important driver enhancing 
agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa. They found that the return from 
investment in agricultural research is statistically significant and positive, and donors 
could gain up to USD 6 on every dollar spent on international agricultural research.  
3.4.2 Agricultural Policies 
According to the OECD (2013), foreign aid to improve agricultural policies on 
average accounted for 19.9% of agricultural aid from 1995 to 2011. Binswanger-Mkhize 
and McCalla (2010) mentioned that improved trade and macroeconomic policies could 
provide better incentives to the agriculture sector, thus affecting agricultural production 
growth. According to them, policies along with the growing general economic 
environment are the factors behind agricultural recovery in Africa. World Bank (2008) 
also takes this position in 2008 World Bank Report: Agriculture for Development by 
calls for innovative policy initiatives to help transforming countries shift to high-value 
agriculture and providing assistance to help move people out of agriculture. Furthermore, 
Binswanger-Mkhize and McCalla (2010) stated that continuous investments from both 
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the public and private sectors were needed to maintain more rapid growth in agricultural 
production.  
Yu and Nin Pratt (2011) also analyzed the relationship between agricultural 
policy and agricultural productivity. They used a nonparametric Malmquist index to 
analyze the total factor productivity index for Africa. They claimed that policy was a key 
factor in improving sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural productivity. Moreover, the 
conditional aid provided by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
United States Agency for International Development could heavily influence trade policy 
in African countries. 
To summarize, we see great emphasis in the literature on learning how 
agricultural research and agricultural policies can improve productivity. As we can see 
from Figure 7, however, they only account for 7% and 19.9% of total aid to agriculture 
over the last 17 years. Thus, it would be interesting to see how the entire flow of 
agricultural foreign aid can affect agricultural productivity, or if the other 73% of aid to 
agriculture is ineffective. In order to evaluate the impact of aid on agricultural 
productivity, the measurement of the agricultural productivity itself becomes necessary. 
3.5 Agricultural Total Factor Productivity Estimation 
In this part we will review some methods used to estimate agricultural TFP. These 
methods can be found in many studies. Some of the most recent estimations come from 
Fuglie and Rada (2013), Rezek (2011) and Alene (2010).  
As mentioned above, Fuglie and Rada (2013) used the production function 
method to estimate annual TFP growth for 48 African countries from 1985 to 2008. They 
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also provided a list of existing studies on agricultural TFP growth for sub-Saharan Africa 
in the past. Since this will also be the primary estimation method that we use, we will 
first review their estimation procedure here. According to Fuglie and Rada (2013), the 
growth of TFP is the difference between aggregate output growth and contributions from 
aggregate input growth. The results of their estimation are the annual TFP growth of all 
sub-Saharan African countries from 1961 to 2008. Due to data availability issues, Fuglie 
and Rada’s analysis excludes South Africa, Nigeria, Congo DR, Angola, Somalia, and 15 
small countries. 
The formula that Fuglie and Rada used to estimate TFP growth is presented as: 
ln?????? ?????






????? ???      (1) 
The left side of the equation represents the TFP growth rate in log format, where 
“c” represents an individual sub-Saharan African country, “t” represents year, and ????? 
is an estimated value of TFP for specific country c at time t. ????? is the TFP value in 
the base year for country “c”.  
On the right side of the equation, Y represents the agricultural output of an 
African countries (c), ???? is a variable representing production inputs j of country “c” at 
year “t”. The variable ???? represents the quality of the natural resources of country “c” at 
year “t”. The estimated coefficient values of input variables and quality of natural 
resource variables are represented by ???  and ???. These coefficients are estimated as an 
agricultural production function. In this Cobb-Douglas production function regression, 
they used farming input factors including land, labor, livestock, machinery and fertilizer 
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as independent variables and agricultural output as the dependent variable. Table 3 
presents the results of this regression, taken from Fuglie and Rada’s (2013) paper.  






(*** significant at 1% level) 
Agricultural Labor 0.249 
Crop Area Harvested 0.315 0.021 *** 
Animal Stocks 0.357 0.016 *** 
Farm Machinery 0.024 0.007 *** 
Fertilizers 0.055 0.005 *** 
R2 Within 0.52 
R2 Between 0.451 
R2 Overall 0.456 
Source: Fuglie and Rada (2013). Number of observations = 1,176, covering 28 countries 
over 1965-2006  
 
 
In our analysis, we ignore the effect of natural resources on agricultural 
production because in this model it is assumed fixed over time for one country, thus it 
will not affect TFP change of individual country over time. So the variable Z in equation 
(1) that stands for quality of natural resources and its correlated elasticity factor ??? are 
omitted. The simplified model becomes: 
ln?????? ?????
? ? = ln (??? ???? )? ? ??
?? ln?
????
????? ???                                        (2) 
This is the model we are going to use in the following analysis. 
Some other estimation methods include Alene (2010) and Rezek (2011). Alene 
(2010) applied a Malmquist distance function under contemporaneous and sequential 
technology frontiers to estimate a cross country TFP index for 47 African countries over 
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the period 1970–2004. His results do not contain a TFP index for Congo and South Sudan. 
By decomposing TFP growth into technical progress and efficiency change, Alene 
claimed that technical progress was the principle source of TFP growth. Furthermore, he 
confirmed the positive relationship between productivity and agricultural research, 
weather (rainfall), and trade policy reform.  
Rezek (2011) used methods including data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
stochastic frontier analysis, Bayesian methods, and generalized maximum entropy to 
measure a Malmquist TFP index for 39 sub-Saharan African countries from 1961 to 2007. 
In his paper, Rezek claimed that the DEA approach performed poorly in measuring TFP 
growth, whereas the other three approaches generated satisfactory and similar results. He 
also claimed that technical change accounted for more than two thirds of the TFP growth, 
and higher technical growth rates were observed in Southern Africa more so than in 
Northern Africa. 
One important shortfall of the estimations of these authors is that their research 
featured the period from the 1980s to the 2000s (Fuglie and Rada) or longer (Alene and 
Rezek). Thus, average change of the agricultural productivity growth for a shorter, more 
recent period, such as that from 2000 to 2010 was not studied. So if productivity has 
accelerated, these methods would not show that outcome. Because of this, we will redo 
Fuglie and Rada’s (2013) estimation to measure the most recent TFP changes.
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CHAPTER 4. BREAKTHROUGH OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN AFRICA 
4.1 Crop Groups Representing African Agricultural Production 
One of the hypotheses proposed earlier is that Africa’s crop production exhibited 
acceleration around the year 2000. To analyze the growth trend from 2000 to the present, 
I extend the time scope for my analysis back to 1989. Thus, the sample size is doubled. 
The period of this research is now from 1989 to the latest year when FAO data are 
typically available (2007 or 2008). 
Because food security is the major concern of our research, I paid close attention 
to the supply of agricultural products that have the most significant impact on the food 
security conditions of Africa.  These agricultural products should fulfill the primary daily 
calorie demands of African people. Below we use FAO data to select a group of crops 
that serve as the major sources of calories on a daily basis in Africa. We use these crops 
to study food production in Africa. 
Using data for this period on food supply of Africa (total) in units of kilocalories 
per capita per day (FAO, 2012), we generate Table 4 which shows the share of each 
product in total food supply. From the table we can see that over this period, among the 
total food supply coming from vegetable products, 53% were from cereals (excluding 
beer). While the rest of the vegetable products contain 13 categories, each category 
occupied only a small share. The second and third largest categories- Cassava and Yam, 
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only provide on average 219 kcal/capita/day to African people, accounting for about 10% 
of the total food supply. So I decided to use cereals as the primary source of calories for 
African people, given their percentage share in total food supply (53%). In other words, 
this research covers 53% of the total agricultural production in Africa. 
According to the FAO’s definition, cereals include 17 primary cereals (wheat, rice 
paddy, barley, maize, white maize, popcorn, rye, oats, millets, sorghum, buckwheat, 
quinoa, fonio, triticale, canary seed, mixed grain and cereals nes). However, maize, 
millets, rice (milled equivalent), sorghum and wheat are the most important cereals 
among them. According to FAO (2012), from 1989 to 2009 the amount of calories that 
people in 51 African countries took from these five crops was 1087 kcal/capita/day, 
which in total account for about 97% of the 1123 kcal/capita/day calories from all cereals 
(FAO,2012). Thus, maize, millets, rice (milled equivalent), sorghum and wheat are 
chosen as primary food crops.   
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Table 4 Calories Contribution and Share of Each Product among Vegetal Products in 
Africa’s Food Supply 
Category 1989-2009 Average 
kcal/capita/day 
Percentage of Total 
Products 
Alcoholic Beverages + (Total) 43 2% 
Cereals - Excluding Beer + 
(Total) 
1238 53% 
Fruits - Excluding Wine + (Total) 96 4% 
Miscellaneous + (Total) 1 0% 
Oilcrops + (Total) 49 2% 
Pulses + (Total) 88 4% 
Spices + (Total) 7 0% 
Stimulants + (Total) 2 0% 
Sugar & Sweeteners + (Total) 146 6% 
Sugarcrops + (Total) 5 0% 
Treenuts + (Total) 9 0% 
Vegetable oils + (Total) 202 9% 
Vegetables + (Total) 39 2% 
Cassava 160 7% 
Yams 59 3% 
Grand total + (Total) 2332 100% 
Source: author’s calculation, from FAO (2012) 
 
Having identified the group of crops to represent agricultural production from the 
perspective of calorie contribution, I will also explore it from geographic perspective. 
Africa has more than 50 countries facing different environments. The crops each country 
grows are quite diversified. We use crop harvested area data (USDA, 2012) to measure 
the location and density of each of these cereal products. Figure 8 is a dot density map for 
major crops in Africa, with six colors representing six major crops. One dot equals 5000 
hecters (HA) of planted area. Thus, the more concentrated the dots are, the more area 
harvested in that particular region. From this figure we can see the cereal planting 
preferences in different countries. Maize, millet, rice, sorghum and wheat are the primary 
crops in Africa.  
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 Figure 8 Major Crops Planted Area in Africa 
Source: Author’s calculation, using USDA Foreign Agricultural Service's Production, 




Figure 9 Major Sources of Calories in Africa 





To make the results clearer, we use USDA data to define which cereal product is 
the single largest source of calories for each country (Figure 9). Figure 9 is an African 
map with countries marked in different colors. Each color represents one of the five crops 
that serve as the major sources of calories. Thus, the largest source of calories for a 
particular country is marked out by the color of that crop. We can see from Figure 9 that 
wheat is the major source of calories for North Africa. West Africa grows a mixed group 
of coarse grains. Middle Africa grows sorghum, maize and wheat. East Africa grows 
maize and rice. South Africa grows maize and wheat. 
The crops group that includes maize, millet, rice (milled equivalent), sorghum and 
wheat combined stands for the single largest group of agricultural products that provide 
calories to people in Africa. If not specified, below we typically use “grain” as the name 
of this aggregate cereals group. 
4.2 Dynamics of Africa’s Agriculture over the Last 20 Years 
After deciding on the cereals group that could represent agricultural products, we 
use it to analyze the change in African agriculture over the last 20 years. To measure this 
change we will use crop production and yield as indicators. Production shows the gross 
quantity of agricultural output, whereas yield partially shows the productivity of 
agriculture. Because production is equal to yield multiplied by area harvested, we use 
area harvested as a third indicator. We compare the growth trends of production and area 
harvested in Africa from 1989 to 2012 in Figure 10 and the growth trends of production 





Figure 10 Grain Production Growth and Area Harvested Growth in Africa. 
Source: USDA’s PSD online database. 
 
In Figure 10 grain area harvested (1000HA) in Africa is reported in columns, with 
the value shown on the right vertical axis. From 1989 to 1996 it grows smoothly. Then 
grain area harvested stays around 90,000,000 hectares until 2004. Since 2005 grain area 
harvested has expanded slowly. Grain production (in 1000MT) for Africa is represented 
by the solid line, with units shown on the left vertical axis. As Figure 10 shows, the trend 
of production growth was strongly correlated with the trend of area harvested before 
2002. From 1989 to 2002, production increased 28.9% and area harvested increase 22.0%; 
from 2002 to 2012, production increased 45.1%, while area expanded only 14.9%. This 
result agrees with the historical research that agricultural production growth in Africa was 
based almost entirely on area expansion during the period before 2000, whereas yield 







































































































(2003), most of the agricultural production increases in Africa were due to area expansion 
before 2000. They found that the growth rate of crop production in sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1981 to 2000 was 3.19% per year, with area expansion contributing 2.82% per year 
and yield only contributing 0.36% per year.  They argued that this growth pattern might 
be due to the mix of crops and agro-ecological complexity in the region. They also 
mentioned that in the future countries in that region must disseminate new technology 
and stimulate domestic food production to prevent further food insecurity.  
After 2002 the growth of production became increasingly faster than the growth 
of area harvested, indicating that the link between areas harvested and production 
quantity started to disconnect. Because of this, the productivity for grain production in 
Africa should have improved faster, taking over the role of area harvested expansion in 
stimulating production growth.  
 
Figure 11 Grain Production Growth and Yield Growth in Africa 
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In Figure 11 grain production (1000MT) in Africa is reported in columns, with 
values shown on the left vertical axis. The solid line represents yield (MT/HA), with 
values shown on the right vertical axis. Figure 11 shows that the trend of grain production 
growth eventually became strongly correlated with the trend of yield growth, especially 
after 2000. Since 2000 we observe a fast increase in production growth (49.9% from 
2000 to 2012) and yield growth (28.9% from 2000 to 2012) simultaneously. It is 
contradictory to the period from 1989 to 2000, during which production only increased 
24.8% and yield only increased 3.5%. From 2008 to 2010, production grew from 138 
(million MT) to 144 (million MT), with a growth rate of 4.3%. At the same time yield 
grew from 1.452 to 1.504 (MT/HA), with a growth rate of 3.5%. It is clear that yield and 
production grew together, and area harvested increases had become less significant. 
These figures indicate that yield growth has become the new driver for grain 
production growth in Africa after 2002. At the same time, the driving force from area 
harvested has weakened due to the decelerating speed of area expansion. For Africa as a 
group, we see from 1999 both its production and yield had a huge breakthrough on 
growth rates, which accelerated significantly compared to the previous growth trend. 
Below we will use a regression model to identify the accurate year of breakthrough for 
individual African countries and to measure how much faster agricultural production was 
growing. 
4.3 Model and Data 
To identify the year of acceleration of grain production growth, yield or area 
harvested increase, I use a piecewise-regression model (Model 1). It is a “broken-stick” 
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model, and is used to capture an abrupt threshold, where two straight lines join sharply at 
an unknown point representing the relevant threshold (Toms & Lesperance, 2003). This 
model includes two linear regression lines using production, yield or area harvested as the 
dependent variable and year as independent variable. The first linear regression line has a 
time scope from the beginning year of the regression to a certain year; the second linear 
regression line has a time scope from that certain year to the end of period. This certain 
year that the two regression lines interact is called the “breakpoint year”. To have a valid 
breakpoint year requires the slopes of these two lines to be significantly different.  
The model is shown as follows: 
?? = ?
???? + ?? ? ?? + ??  ,                                                 ???  ?? < ?
???? + ?? ? ?? + ?? ? (?? ? ?) + ??,                     ???  ?? ? ?
                (????? 1) 
Dependent variable ??  represents the production, yield or area harvested value in 
country ?. Independent variable ?? is  ? country’s value of time which is year in this 
case. ???? is the constant, ?? is an independent additive error, and  ? represents the 
threshold point, which is the breakpoint year in this case. For country ? before year ? and 
after year ?, Model 1 has two regression lines. In the model, ?? is the coefficient of the 
first function, which is the slope of the first regression line featuring time from the 
starting year to the breakpoint year, whereas ?? + ?? is the coefficient of the second 
function, which is the slope of the second regression line featuring time after the 
breakpoint year. So ?? is the change in slopes of the two regression lines (Toms and 
Lesperance, 2003); it can be used to measure the percentage change of production, yield 
or area harvested growth after the breakpoint year. To identify the breakpoint ?? must 
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meet two requirements: (1) ??  must be positive to represent acceleration of the growth 
trend, and (2)  ?? must be statistically significant (at a 90% confidence level). 
To get the maximum sample size and make the study more representative, country 
? includes 44 Africa countries that have available data over the period 1989-2012 (USDA, 
2012). We use a separate regression to analyze the breakpoint for each country 
individually. We also use the summation of all 44 countries as a new dependent variable 
set called “total”. Thus, in total there are 44 groups of dependent variables ??. Each group 
has 24 years of observations (from 1989 to 2012). By dividing the value of 
production/yield/area harvested in each year by its average value from 2000 to 2012, the 
dependent variable ?? becomes a percentage of each year’s production quantity/yield/area 
harvested value, on average. This way ?? becomes more comparable across countries 
because the change in ?? over a year is now the percentage growth rather than quantity 
growth. So ??, which was the slope difference between two regression lines that measure 
the quantity change of production/yield/area harvested over certain years, now becomes 
the difference between two regression lines that measure the percentage change of 
production/yield/area harvested growth over certain years. Independent variable ?? is the 
value of year for country ?. To simplify the regression we assign the value 1 to year 1989, 
2 to year 1990, etc. The rest can be done in the same manner until 24 is assigned to year 
2012. The same analogy could also apply to the year of breakpoint ?, so ? is a number 
from 1 to 24 as well.  
We use the data from the Foreign Agricultural Service of the US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) through its Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD) online 
database. As stated in other research (Fuglie, Lee, Ndulo, et al., 2011), the PSD database 
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is more accurate than the FAO database for production, yield and area harvested 
information for grains in Africa, and it is available for more recent years.  
4.4 Results 
As discussed above, first we identify the “total” breakpoint year for Africa. We 
use 2000 to 2008 as the possible breakpoint year (?), and run piecewise-regressions on 
each of the three dependent variables. Table 5 shows the regression result using the 
example of total production percentage over its average as the dependent variable and 
2002 as the breakpoint year. 
Table 5 Piecewise Regression Result on Total Production Using 2002 as Breakpoint Year 
Variable Coefficient t 
?? 0.0191 6.87 
?? 0.0150 3.31 
constant 0.6089 27.67 
Source: Author’s calculation, using USDA’s PSD dataset and STATA software. ?? is the 
difference in two piecewise-regression lines’ slope. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that if 2002 is the breakpoint year, the coefficient ?? of variable ?? 
is 0.0191 and ?? is 0.0150. This means that production grew at 1.91% per year before 
2002 and 3.41% per year after 2002, 1.5% faster. The t value shows that coefficients ?? 
and ?? are both significant at 95% confidence level. Because ?? is significant, there are 
significant differences between this period’s slope and the previous period’s slope. The 






Table 6 ?? for Total Production in Africa Using 2000 To 2008 as the Breakpoint Year. 
Breakpoint Year ?? t 
2000 0.0116 2.75 
2001 0.0139 3.11 
2002 0.0150 3.31 
2003 0.0132 2.79 
2004 0.0118 2.21 
2005 0.0089 1.46 
2006 0.0033 0.47 
2007 0.0034 0.34 
2008 -0.0059 -0.46 
Source: Author’s calculation, using USDA’s PSD dataset and STATA software. ?? is the 
difference in two piecewise-regression lines’ slope. 
 
 
From Table 6 we can see that under a 95% confidence level coefficients ?? are 
significant when using 2000 to 2004 as the breakpoint (?). In 2002, however, coefficient 
?? has the biggest value and the largest t value. This is when the change from ?? to 
?? + ?? is largest. In this case multiple years fulfill the conditions to become the year of 
breakthrough, but 2002 stands out as the most significant “breakpoint”. This implies that 
the production acceleration transition maybe gradual over few years, but over time the 





Figure 12 Piecewise Regression: showing 2002 as a Breakpoint  
Source: Author’s calculation using STATA. 
Figure 12 is drawn based on the regression results shown in Tables 4 and 5 using 
2002 as the presumed breakpoint year. In Figure 12 we can see two straight lines that 
meet at 2002. The second line is more upward sloped than the first line. The line before 
2002 has slope ??=0.0191. The line after 2002 has slope ?? + ??=0.0191+0.0150=0.0341, 
which is significantly steeper than ??. Thus, Africa in total had a breakthrough in grain 
production at around 2002. 
Appling the same method, we identify the breakpoints for yield and area 
harvested in total for Africa in Table 7.  
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Table 7 ?? for Total Yield and Area Harvested In Africa Using 2000 To 2008 as Possible 
Breakpoint Years 
Yield Area harvested 
Breakpoint Year ?? t ?? t 
2000 0.0166 4.86 -0.0084 -2.73 
2001 0.0169 5.03 -0.0062 -1.84 
2002 0.0165 4.76 -0.0047 -1.35 
2003 0.0144 4.15 -0.0046 -1.17 
2004 0.0117 3.01 -0.0034 -0.78 
2005 0.0111 2.14 -0.0057 -1.11 
2006 0.0065 1.07 -0.0067 -1.1 
2007 0.0060 0.7 -0.0061 -0.81 
2008 0.0001 0.01 -0.0091 -0.92 
Source: Author’s calculation, using USDA’s PSD dataset and STATA software. ?? is the 
difference in two piecewise-regression lines’ slope. 
 
 
From Table 7 we can see that for African grain yield, the largest coefficient ??, 
and the largest t value are found in 2001. This helps us to identify the breakpoint for yield 
in Africa as 2001. For area harvested, however, even though the t value is significant at 
90% in 2000 and 2001, there is no breakpoint in Africa, as its  ?? values are all negative 
from 2000 to 2008. This means area expansion in Africa was slowing down over this 
period. Figure 9 and 10 confirm this result, so we can conclude that African countries as a 
group achieved a breakthrough in grain production at around 2002. This was largely 
achieved due to the breakthrough for grain yield in about 2001. This indicates that unlike 
its past growth, which heavily relied on area expansion, production growth has been more 




4.5 African Countries’ Breakpoint and Breakthrough Years 
Table 8 presents the result for breakthrough years on grain production, area 
harvested and yield for other countries in Africa applying the method stated above. 
Model 1 is run for 44 African countries, with the results showing that 24 countries 
successfully achieved breakthroughs in grain production. Tables 8, 9 and 10 show the 
coefficients and t-values for these regressions, using the same method applied above for 
Africa overall to find the breakpoint year of production, area harvested and yield for 
these 24 countries. Table 8 shows the results and identified reasons leading to grain 
production breakthrough for these countries.  
Because production is equal to area harvested times yield, when production 
increased significantly, at least one of the other two variables should increase with 
production simultaneously. So we consider the variables that had breakthrough at the 
same year (or one year before or after to avoid measurement error) with the production 
breakthrough as the reasons behind that production breakthrough. Besides, considering 
the possible lag effects of the area expansion or yield increase on crop production, yield 
breakthrough or area expansion breakthrough that happened a few years before the 
production breakthrough could also be considered as the reasons, but not vice versa. 
Using this method, we found that among these 24 countries, 13 countries’ production 
growth was due to breakthrough of yield that took place around the same year or before 
its production break point year (such as Ethiopia). These countries either did not achieve 
breakthrough on area harvested, or the breakthrough on area harvested was far later or 
earlier compared with their production breakthrough. Thus, it cannot be proved that area 
 
62 
expansion had a direct relationship with production growth acceleration. With the same 
logic we can see that the production growth of six countries was due to area expansion 
around the same year, and the production growth of two countries was due to 
breakthroughs for both yield and area harvested. The production growth breakthroughs of 
the rest of the countries have no direct relationship with either yield or area harvested 
because they happened at separate times. The fact that the production growth of more 
countries relied on yield growth explains the overall trend of agricultural growth in 
Africa, as well.  
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Table 8 Countries with Breakthrough in Grain Production and Their Possible 
Explanations 










Possible Reason for 
Production 
Breakthrough 
1 Angola 2008 2001 2006 Yield 
2 Botswana 2003 2003 2001 Area expansion 
3 Burkina Faso 2000 2004 NO Area expansion 
4 Burundi 2000 2000 NO Area expansion 
5 Central African 
Republic 
2000 2000 NO Area expansion 
6 Congo 2004 2007 2008 No direct relation 
7 Ethiopia 2004 NO 2000 Yield 
8 Gambia 2000 2000 NO Area expansion 
9 Guinea 2006 2001 2007 Yield 
10 Guinea-Bissau 2002 2006 NO No direct relation 
11 Kenya 2000 2007 NO No direct relation 
12 Liberia 2005 2004 2005 Yield and Area 
expansion 
13 Madagascar 2001 2002 2001 Yield 
14 Malawi 2005 2000 2005 Yield 
15 Mali 2001 NO 2002 Yield 
16 Mozambique 2006 NO 2005 Yield 
17 Namibia 2001 NO 2001 Yield 
18 Rwanda 2006 2000 2006 Yield 
19 Senegal 2002 2007 2001 Yield 
20 Sierra Leone 2008 2000 2008 Yield 
21 Swaziland 2007 2006 2007 Yield and Area 
expansion 
22 Uganda 2000 NO 2000 Yield 
23 Tanzania 2001 2000 NO Area expansion 
24 Zambia 2008 2005 2007 Yield 
Source: Author’s calculations, using USDA’s PSD dataset and STATA software.
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Table 9 Regression Results on Production Breakpoint Year. 
Country Breakpoint Year ?? t-value ?? t-value 
Angola 2008 0.0345 8.68 0.1265 4.18*** 
Ethiopia 2004 0.025 3.54 0.0601 3.57*** 
Guinea 2006 0.0247 5.29 0.1336 7.23*** 
Liberia 2005 -0.0105 -0.67 0.149 3.13*** 
Madagascar 2001 0.0061 1.02 0.0477 5.69*** 
Malawi 2005 0.0246 2.27 0.0863 2.64*** 
Mali 2001 0.0132 2.08 0.0412 4.61*** 
Mozambique 2006 0.0443 9.75 0.0347 1.93* 
Namibia 2001 0.0264 1.79 0.0543 2.6*** 
Rwanda 2006 0.0085 0.95 0.1524 4.34*** 
Senegal 2002 -0.0055 -0.4 0.0615 2.78*** 
Sierra Leone 2008 0.0145 1.78 0.1711 2.76*** 
Swaziland 2007 -0.0256 -1.73 0.1605 2.02* 
Uganda 2000 0.0065 0.87 0.0297 3.16*** 
Zambia 2008 -0.0006 -0.07 0.2572 4.03*** 
Botswana 2003 -0.0649 -1.96 0.1814 2.83*** 
Burkina Faso 2000 0.0157 1.51 0.0238 1.81* 
Burundi 2000 -0.0658 -4.37 0.0778 4.08*** 
Central African Republic 2000 0.0046 0.48 0.0243 2.02* 
Congo 2004 -0.073 -3.37 0.0975 1.89* 
Gambia 2000 0.0039 0.28 0.043 2.48** 
Guinea-Bissau 2002 -0.019 -2.16 0.0612 4.27*** 
Kenya 2000 -0.007 -0.62 0.0244 1.71* 
United Republic of Tanzania 2001 -0.0025 -0.34 0.0423 4.1*** 
Average ?? for Group A 8.9% 
Average ?? for Group A1 10.4% 
Average ??for Group A2 6.4% 
Source: Author’s calculations, using USDA’s PSD dataset and STATA software. Note: 
Degrees of freedom are 23. T distribution values of ?? are examined, where *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 90% (t>1.71), 95% (t>2.06) and 98% (t>2.50) confidence 









Table 10 Regression Results on Area Harvested Breakpoint Year. 
Country Breakpoint Year ?? t-value ?? t-value 
Angola 2001 0.0207 3.08 0.0351 3.7*** 
Ethiopia No breakpoint 
Guinea 2001 0.0057 0.93 0.0781 8.96*** 
Liberia 2004 -0.018 -1.08 0.0966 2.42** 
Madagascar 2002 0.0034 1.93 0.0067 2.33** 
Malawi 2000 0.0023 0.64 0.0153 3.33*** 
Mali No breakpoint 
Mozambique No breakpoint 
Namibia No breakpoint 
Rwanda 2000 -0.0242 -2.18 0.0632 4.51*** 
Senegal 2007 0.0078 2.19 0.0352 1.84* 
Sierra Leone 2000 -0.0218 -2.05 0.0947 7.03*** 
Swaziland 2006 -0.0195 -3.8 0.0579 2.85*** 
Uganda No breakpoint 
Zambia 2005 -0.0081 -1.46 0.1086 6.49*** 
Botswana 2003 -0.0524 -2.92 0.1041 3*** 
Burkina Faso 2004 0.0083 3.04 0.0138 2.11** 
Burundi 2000 -0.0762 -6.03 0.089 5.56*** 
Central African Republic 2000 -0.0524 -3.23 0.0455 2.21** 
Congo 2007 -0.1279 -6.13 0.1279 2.03* 
Gambia 2000 0.0102 1.68 0.0537 7*** 
Guinea-Bissau 2006 -0.0191 -3.08 0.1052 3.16*** 
Kenya 2007 -0.0024 -1.48 0.032 3.67*** 
United Republic of Tanzania 2000 0.0019 0.29 0.0385 4.49*** 
Average ?? for Group A 5.0% 
Average ?? for Group A1 3.9% 
Average ??for Group A2 6.8% 
Source: Author’s calculations, using USDA Foreign Agricultural Service's Production, 
Supply and Distribution (PSD) online database and STATA software. 
 
Note: “No breakpoint” indicates that that country’s t values for  ?? are all negative from 
2000 to 2008. Degrees of freedom are 23. T distribution values of ?? are examined, 
where *, ** and *** indicate significance at 80% (t>1.71), 90% (t>2.06) and 98% (t>2.50) 







Table 11 Regression Results on Yield Breakpoint Year.  
Country Breakpoint year ?? t-value ?? t-value 
Angola 2006 0.0116 1.85 0.0564 2.29*** 
Ethiopia 2000 -0.0194 -2.97 0.0684 8.25*** 
Guinea 2007 0.013 2.91 0.0646 2.69*** 
Liberia 2005 0.0032 0.4 0.0578 2.4*** 
Madagascar 2001 0.0037 0.71 0.0403 5.42*** 
Malawi 2005 0.0194 1.58 0.0716 1.93** 
Mali 2002 0.0094 1.13 0.0282 2.09*** 
Mozambique 2005 0.0201 3.24 0.0251 1.34* 
Namibia 2001 0.0159 1.37 0.0381 2.32*** 
Rwanda 2006 -0.0099 -1.73 0.1391 6.16*** 
Senegal 2001 -0.0134 -1.12 0.0485 2.87*** 
Sierra Leone 2008 -0.0151 -4.96 0.1552 6.7*** 
Swaziland 2007 -0.0015 -0.12 0.1121 1.65* 
Uganda 2000 -0.0156 -2.28 0.0313 3.6*** 
Zambia 2007 -0.003 -0.34 0.1059 2.28*** 
Botswana 2001 -0.0194 -0.78 0.0953 2.71*** 
Burkina Faso No breakpoint 
Burundi No breakpoint 
Central African Republic No breakpoint 
Congo 2008 0.0133 4.38 0.0594 2.56*** 
Gambia No breakpoint 
Guinea-Bissau No breakpoint 
Kenya No breakpoint 
United Republic of Tanzania No breakpoint 
Average ?? for Group A 5.0% 
Average ?? for Group A1 7.0% 
Average ??for Group A2 1.7% 
Source: Author’s calculations, using USDA’s PSD dataset and STATA software.  
Note: “No breakpoint” indicates that that country’s t values for  ?? are all negative from 
2000 to 2008. Degrees of freedom are 23. T distribution values of ?? are examined, 
where *, ** and *** indicate significance at 80% (t>1.32), 90% (t>1.71) and 95% (t>2.06) 





To analyze the effects of production breakthrough on African countries, we can 
classify countries under different circumstances into different groups. The 24 African 
countries that have crop production breakthroughs in recent years are named as Group A. 
The remaining 20 African countries that did not are named as Group B. The 15 countries 
in Group A that had crop production breakthrough due to yield improvement are named 
as Group A1. The eight countries in Group A that had crop production breakthrough due 
to area expansion are named as Group A2. Table 12 presents lists of these groups. 
Table 9, 10 and 11 show the 24 breakthrough countries’ regression results on 
breakpoint year. The first 15 countries listed are Group A1 countries, while the other 9 
countries are Group A2 countries. The average ?? for each group is also listed to 
demonstrate how big the growth rate change before and after breakpoint for each group. 
The average ?? is calcualted using average value of ?? over all countries in the group. 
The value from country that has no breakpoint is set to zero. These average values 
demonstrated how Group A1 has higher average ?? than A2 on yield breakpoint 




Table 12-1 Weight of Countries by Production Quantity (%). Grouped by Production 






Total Grain Production(1000MT) % of 
Group 
Total 
Group A Group B 
Angola 15148 1.77% Benin 22336 1.72% 
Botswana 838 0.10% Cameroon 39329 3.03% 
Burkina 70389 8.24% Cape Verde 226 0.02% 
Burundi 5520 0.65% Chad 27496 2.12% 
Central African 
Republic 
3650 0.43% Comoros 561 0.04% 
Congo (DR) 33286 3.90% Republic of Congo 342 0.03% 
Ethiopia 168470 19.73% Cote d'Ivoire 26584 2.05% 
Gambia, The 3819 0.45% Eritrea 3243 0.25% 
Guinea 25718 3.01% Gabon 747 0.06% 
Guinea-Bissau 3401 0.40% Ghana 144528 11.13% 
Kenya 73009 8.55% Lesotho 3433 0.26% 
Liberia 2838 0.33% Mauritius 20 0.00% 
Madagascar 52432 6.14% Niger 72671 5.60% 
Malawi 49833 5.84% Nigeria 496728 38.25% 
Mali 66356 7.77% Somalia 6583 0.51% 
Mozambique 36175 4.24% South Africa 288879 22.25% 
Namibia 595 0.07% South Sudan 1312 0.10% 
Rwanda 7850 0.92% Sudan 107184 8.25% 
Senegal 24919 2.92% Togo 17273 1.33% 
Sierra Leone 9449 1.11% Zimbabwe 39116 3.01% 
Swaziland 2084 0.24%  
Tanzania 108512 12.71% 
Uganda 53670 6.29% 
Zambia 35943 4.21% 




Table 12-2 Weight of Countries by Production Quantity (%). Grouped by Reasons of 
Production Breakthrough (Group A1 and A2). 
Total Production(1000MT) % of 
Group 
Total 
Total Production(1000MT) % of 
Group 
Total 
Group A1 Group A2 
Angola 15148 2.7% Botswana 838 0.4% 
Ethiopia 168470 30.5% Burkina 70389 35.6% 







Madagascar 52432 9.5% Gambia, The 3819 1.9% 
Malawi 49833 9.0% Liberia 2838 1.4% 
Mali 66356 12.0% Swaziland 2084 1.1% 
Mozambique 36175 6.6% Tanzania 108512 54.9% 
Namibia 595 0.1%  
Rwanda 7850 1.4% 
Senegal 24919 4.5% 
Sierra Leone 9449 1.7% 
Swaziland 2084 0.4% 
Uganda 53670 9.7% 
Zambia 35943 6.5% 
Source: USDA’s PSD online database, 2013. 
 
To better understand the relationship between these groups from the location 
point of view, Figure 13 shows the distribution of different groups of countries on the 
African map. From the figure we can see that Group A countries are located in two 
regions. One region is near the West African coast and the other region is south of the 
equator. The reasons that drove these countries’ production acceleration had no direct 
relationship with where these countries are located, because Group A1 and Group A2 
countries are observed in both regions. However, from Figure 13 we can also see that 
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countries that are adjacent to each other have a tendency to fall into the same group. So 
below we examine countries that are close to each other to see if they have same 




Figure 13 Map of Sub-Saharan African Countries showing Groups. 
Group A1 and A2: countries that had crop production breakthroughs due to area 
expansion and yield improvement simultaneously. Group A (excluding A1 and A2): 
countries that had crop production breakthroughs but with no direct relationship with 
yield or area breakthrough. 
Source: Author’s calculation. Map from Microsoft MapPoint (2012).  
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4.6 Geographical Regions Sorted by Adjacent Year of Agricultural Breakthrough 
One interesting outcome of determining the breakthrough point of all sub-Saharan 
African countries is the finding that adjacent African countries often exhibited adjacent 
years of breakthrough on production. Using adjacent year as an indicator several 
geographical regions can be sorted and mapped. Figure 14 is a map of breakpoints in 
production/yield for the 24 Africa countries using data from Table 8. This will help us to 
study how yield and area harvested affect grain production. From north to south we can 
see that neighboring countries tend to form a group that has the same year of 
breakthrough in grain production. The African continent can be roughly divided into 
eight groups on this map. Each group either had its own timeline or failed to manage a 
production breakthrough. The year of production/yield breakthrough is shown under the 
name of the country. The first number is for the grain production breakpoint while the 
second is for yield breakthrough. “NB” means no breakpoint was found.  If no breakpoint 
was found for both production and yield, the line was left blank. The asterisk mark means 
the country achieved production and yield breakthrough in the same year. Colors are used 
only to separate nearby groups. 
Below are the groups and their brief reasons for breakthrough. The compound 
annual growth rates of production from 1990 to breakpoint year and from breakpoint year 
to 2012 are also presented. 
(1)North African and West African countries, including Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau: This breakthrough happened around 2001. 
Mali and Senegal achieved production breakthroughs due to yield increase. Before 2001, 
their average production growth rate was 1.4%; after that it was 5.5%. Burkina Faso and 
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The Gambia relied more on area expansion. From 1991 to 2001, their production growth 
rate was 2.0% annually; afterwards it became 3.9%. 
(2)West African countries facing the Atlantic Ocean, including Liberia, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone: They achieved grain production breakthroughs at around 2005 to 2008. 
Liberia’s production breakthrough was the joint effect of yield increase and area 
expansion. At the same time, yield increase was the major motivation behind production 
breakthroughs in Guinea and Sierra Leone. Before the breakpoint year, the production 
growth rate was 3.8%; afterwards it increased to 13.1%. 
(3) Central African countries, including Central African Republic and Republic of 
Congo: Central African Republic’s production breakthrough happened in 2000, and was 
mainly dependent on area expansion. Its production growth rate increased from 1.4% 
annually before 2000 to 1.9% after that. On the other hand, the breakthrough of crop 
production in the Republic of Congo happened in 2004, and had no direct relationship 
with either area expansion in 2007 or yield increase in 2008, because the time interval 
between them is large.  
(4)East African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and 
Tanzania as a group accelerated their production trend at around 2000. The production 
breakthroughs of Ethiopia, Burundi and Tanzania were due to area expansion, whereas 
for Uganda the breakthrough was due to yield increase. Before 2000 the production 
average of Ethiopia, Burundi and Tanzania grew at 3.2% annually on average. After that 
it increased to 4.9% annually. The same thing happened to Uganda, which increased its 
production growth rate from 1.5% to 4.1% after breakthrough. Kenya’s production 
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breakthrough was in 2000, whereas its area expansion took place far later in 2007. Thus, 
no direct relationship can be found between production and area expansion.  
(5)Another group of East African countries, including Malawi, Mozambique, 
Angola, Zambia and Swaziland achieved production breakthroughs after 2005, mainly 
due to increasing yield. After breakthrough, their compound annual average production 
growth rate increased from 2.5% to 11.4%. 
(6) Namibia and Botswana form a separate group, with production breakthroughs 
happening in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Namibia’s production breakthrough was due 
to the yield increase in the same year. Its compound annual production growth rate 
increased from -1.2% to 7.2% after breakthrough. Botswana’s production breakthrough 
in 2003 was due to area expansion in 2001. Its compound annual production growth rate 
increased from -12.3% to 13.0% after breakthrough.   
(7) Madagascar is the largest island of Africa. Because it is isolated from the 
mainland, it becomes a separate group. Crop production (mainly rice) broke through the 
old pattern in 2001 due to yield improvement. Its compound annual production growth 
rate increased from 0.9% to 4.2% after breakthrough. 
(8)The rest of the countries had insufficient data or did not exhibit a breakthrough 







Figure 14 Year of Breakthrough of Production and Yield for African Countries. 
 




Based on the analysis above, we can see that production acceleration frequently 
took place across a country’s border and happened on a larger space. This implies that 
natural variables that impact agriculture beyond political boundaries such as climate and 
geographic landscapes might also play important roles in stimulating sub-Saharan 
African countries’ grain production acceleration. Below we will see how drought that 
happened in recent years affected agricultural production in many African countries. 
4.7 Influence of Breakthrough in Related Countries on Supply-Use Balance 
Having considered the geographic distribution of country groups, we now focus 
on the influence of grain production acceleration on the supply and demand balance of 
related countries. It is known from supply-use balance that the summation of grain 
production, imports and beginning stocks is equal to the summation of domestic 
consumption, exports and ending stocks. The beginning stocks are equal to the previous 
year’s ending stocks. Figure 15 shows the trends of each group’s ending stock, 
production quantity, domestic consumption quantity, import quantity and export quantity 





Figure 15 Trend of African Country Groups’ Grain Imports, Exports, Production, 






















































































































































































Figure 15 Continued. 



































































































































































































A quick look at Figure 15 shows that domestic consumption grows smoothly at a 
positive rate in every African country group. It has a growth pattern similar to these 
countries’ population growth. As domestic consumption is correlated with population, we 
could expect domestic consumption in African countries to continue to grow in the near 
future, because Africa’s population is expected continue to grow at 1.64 % annual rate 
until 2050 according to United Nation’s projection in 2004 (Department of Economic 
Social Affairs). At the same time, the income growth rate of sub-Saharan African 
countries’ will also accelerate according to World Development Report. (World Bank, 
2007)  
The first page of Figure 15 features Group A and Group B. As a country group, 
Group A has exhibited clear acceleration in production since 2002. The net growth of 
production quantity was 23 million tons between 2003 and 2013, whereas the net growth 
between 1961 and 2003 was only 22 million tons. This corresponds with results on the 
production breakpoint years in Table 8. Table 8 shows that all break point years fall into 
the range between 2000 and 2008, the median year is 2003. We can also see domestic 
consumption growing faster than production, which leads to an expanding gap between 
demand and supply, and increasing imports. At the same time, Group B also exhibited 
rising in production, but the net growth was not as rapid as Group A. The net growth 
between 2003 and 2013 was only 6 million tons. 
Figure 15 shows that although grain production grew rapidly in recent years, the 
quantity and the percentage share of imported grain over total grain supply have 
increased in most of the African countries (Group A rises from 6% in 1961 to 16% in 
2013, Group B rises from 4% in 1961 to 23% in 2013). At the same time, export quantity 
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decreased to almost zero as domestic consumption and ending stocks increased. This 
indicates that most of the African countries are not self-sufficient at this time. However, 
countries in Group A and Group B have different patterns of import growth.  
For Group A, from 1960 to 2002 the percentage of grain imported increased from 
6% in 1961 to 20% in 2002. After 2002, due to the breakthrough in grain production, the 
percentage of grain imported stopped its growth and remained below 19% of total 
domestic consumption. Compared with Group A, Group B exhibits a slower and more 
linear production growth. Unlike Group A countries that are always unable to meet self-
sufficiency, countries in Group B had grain production that enable them to nearly meet 
their domestic consumption needs during 1961 to 1995. During this period, the 
percentage of grain imported remained below 10% most of the time. Since then, the gap 
between demand and supply started to become larger. The percentage of grain imported 
increased with a 0.7% annual increase from 1995 to 2013. As time passed, these 
countries became more dependent on imported grains, making them more vulnerable to 
international grain price changes. In 2013, 23% of Group B’s total grain supply came 
from imported grains, which was higher than the Group A’s 16.3% for that year. The 
production acceleration in Group A countries since 2003 played an important role in 
decreasing import dependency, even if imports are still growing slowly. If the production 
curve of Group A had followed a linear growth pattern, the gap between production and 
consumption would be much larger, just like Group B.  
It can be seen from Figure 15 that Group A2 has a smaller percentage of imported 
grain (on average 11.1% from 1961 to 2013) compared with Group A1 (on average 16.2% 
from 1961 to 2013). The percentage of imported grain in Group A1 increased from 11.8% 
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in 1996 to 30.9% in 2002 then decreased to 14.3% in 2010. That of Group A2 increased 
from 6.7% in 1995 to 19.0% at 2004 and then decreased to 13.8.8% at 2010. It seems 
Group A1 and A2 successfully lowered the percentage of imported grain during the 
period from 2002 to 2010. However, after 2010 an impact of food crisis on Group A1 and 
Group A2 countries started to show up. We can see that Group A1 and A2’s production 
quantity stopped growth, whereas their domestic consumption kept increasing after 2010, 
so the percentages of imported grain started to climb again.  
Recently, an important phenomenon is that the growing trend of grain production 
has stopped. For Group A, grain production stopped increasing after 2010. For Group B, 
grain production contracted from 2008 to 2011, and then returned to growth after 2011. 
Part of the reasons might be the massive natural disasters that took place in many 
countries during that period, including drought and floods in 2010 and 2011 in west 
Africa. In addition to these, it is possible that countries in Group A that successfully 
accelerated their production before 2008 experienced the impact of the food price shock 
later than countries in Group B, and are still suffering from it right now, whereas 
countries in Group B recovered from the crisis in 2012.  These movements might be 
related to the world food crisis that took place around 2008. As stated by Abbott and de 
Battisti (2011), during the world food crisis, several factors would mitigate against 
Africa’s agricultural production growth such as rising input costs and a worsening 
macroeconomics environment. One of the most important factors they mentioned was 
fertilizer. Thus, below we will analysis how the changes in fertilizer availability and 
prices might impact different country groups, using the data presented in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16 World Fertilizer Price and sub-Saharan African Country Group’s Fertilizer 
Consumption. Fertilizer consumption includes N+P2O5+K2O N-equivalents (metric 
tons). Group B not including South Africa. 
 
Source: 1. World Bank (2014) 2.Fuglie and Rada(2013).  
 
Figure 16 shows the world fertilizer price from 1995 to 2013 and related fertilizer 






































Group B excludes South Africa. Because South Africa accounted for 44% total fertilizer 
consumption in Africa and its demand remained relatively stable in recent decade, the 
presence of South Africa in the calculation will double the consumption amount and 
make the trend for the group unclear. We can see that the world fertilizer price 
significantly rose after 2007, imposing an aggravated cost to African farmers.  
Comparing Group A with Group B, it is clear that Group A started to consume more 
fertilizer than Group B from 2003. More specifically, Figure 16 shows that Group A1 
countries significantly increased the amount usage of fertilizer after 2003. At the same 
time, the fertilizer consumption of Group A2 countries hardly increased. During this 
period, Group A countries had production breakthroughs. This implies that fertilizer 
could be an important driving factor behind the yield breakthroughs.  
However, these countries’ fertilizer consumption was highly sensitive to world 
fertilizer price changes. As soon as the world fertilizer price started to rise in 2007, the 
consumption started to fall. Due to the lack of fertilizer consumption data after 2010, it is 
hard to come to any further conclusion on how fertilizer consumption of Group A 
countries corresponds with international fertilizer prices in recent years. Overall, the 
world food crisis revealed the fragility of growth via yield improvement. Many input 
factors that contributed to yield improvement like fertilizer are dependent on imports. 
Thus, once these input factors became inaccessible or unavailable (or expensive) due to 
reasons such as unacceptable high price, the agricultural production in Group A was 
heavily affected. Thus, the current successful production growth pattern that relies on 
yield improvement requires further study in the future. The mechanism of how yield is 
improved should be investigated, including the share of each contributing input factor in 
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yield improvement and that input’s dependency on world markets. It is common that sub-
Saharan African countries have to trade-offs between importing more inputs and 
importing food when facing food crisis in short term. Policy makers and producers need 
to prepare for the next crisis that is similar to the last world food crisis. 
Compared with Group A countries, Group B countries that did not experience 
production acceleration consumed less fertilizer. It was not until 2008 when their 
fertilizer consumption started to increase, in spite of the high fertilizer price. However, 
detailed investigation indicates that it was primarily due to an unexpectedly large amount 
of fertilizer usage in Nigeria from 2008, which now is the largest consumer country (35% 
of total consumption) in Group B. The amount of fertilizer it consumed was doubled in 
2008 (514,856 tons) compared with 2007 (235,522 tons). The rest of the Group B 
countries’ fertilizer uses remained stable from 2008 to 2013, which is consistent with 
their stable grain production trends. 
Based on this review on sub-Saharan African countries’ grain supply and demand, 
we come up with the conclusion that as the domestic demand for grain continued to 
increase. The grain production breakthroughs will help to stabilize the growth of the 
imported grain share in countries that are able to achieve grain production breakthroughs. 
Among Group A countries, those countries in Group A2 have a slightly lower 
dependency on imports. Countries in Group A1 used more fertilizer, but are also 
vulnerable to world fertilizer price changes. In fact, recent years’ high fertilizer price 
might have contributed to the suspension of production growth of Group A1 countries. 
For Group B, the tendency of increasing dependence on imports continued to grow. 
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CHAPTER 5. EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID ON AFRICA’S AGRICULTURE  
5.1 Foreign Aid and Grain Production Breakthrough 
In the previous chapter we identified a group of sub-Saharan African countries 
that achieved grain production breakthroughs after 2000. We then classified countries 
into groups based on whether they had a production breakthrough, and on the reasons that 
motivated them to achieve such a production breakthrough. To measure the effectiveness 
of foreign aid on Africa’s agriculture, we first examine whether countries that received 
more aid were countries had a crop production breakthrough for recent years. Foreign aid 
commitment received by different country groups is compared in Table 13.  We classified 
these groups based on whether they had a production breakthrough and the reasons for 






Table 13 Comparison of Sub-Saharan African Country Groups’ Aid Received and 














Number of Countries 24 20 15 8 
Agricultural Aid Received 
Total (1995-2011) Ag Aid  20874 8513 2.5 14238 6185 2.3 
1995-2011Aid Received Per 
Capita (2011 $, using 
2011Population) 
44 21 2.11 50 50 1.00 
Ag Aid Received Per 
Year(1995-2011) 1228 501 2.5 838 285 3.0 
Aid Received Per Capita Per 
Year (2011 $, using 
2011Population) 
2.61 1.24 2.11 2.95 2.94 1.00 
Total Ag Aid 
 
1995-2000 5239 2524 2.1 3727 1161 3.2 
2001-2006 6215 1885 3.3 3956 1549 2.6 
2007-2011 9420 4103 2.3 6555 2532 2.6 
Ag Aid Received 
per Capita per 
Year ($) 
1995-2000 2.71 1.44 1.88 3.25 2.90 1.12 
2001-2006 2.70 0.93 2.90 2.89 3.35 0.86 
2007-2011 4.21 2.12 1.98 4.88 4.45 1.10 
Agricultural GDP 
Agricultural GDP Per Capita Per 








Agricultural GDP Per Capita Per 
Year  2983 2932 1.02 2101 897 2.34 
Average Ag Aid Received Per 
Dollar of Ag GDP ($) 0.036 0.026 1.39 0.040 0.032 1.25 
Note: If not specified, agricultural aid is measured in 2011 US dollars (million), per 
capita items are measured in 2011 US dollars and 2011 population data, agricultural GDP 
growth are measured in constant 2005 US dollars. 
 





We first compare Group A with Group B to see if countries that experienced crop 
production breakthroughs received more aid.  From 1995 to 2011, the 24 countries in 
Group A received USD 21 billion (2011 USD) in agricultural aid in total, USD 44 per 
capita or USD 2.61 per capita every year. Group B only received USD 9 billion in 
agricultural aid in total, USD 21 per capita or USD 1.24 per capita every year. Each year, 
the countries in Group A on average received more than double the amount of 
agricultural aid that countries in Group B received. If we analyze this trend in six year 
time intervals, we can further see that Group A received 3.3 times higher an amount of 
aid than that of Group B during the period 2001-2006, due to the unexpected low amount 
of aid that was going to Group B. In the most recent five years, both groups received 
more aid than before. These trends correspond with the results in part 2.2.2. To sum up, it 
is clear that countries that have achieved production breakthroughs received much more 
agricultural aid than countries that have not. 
We then compare Group A1 and Group A2 to see if countries that have had crop 
production breakthroughs due to different reasons received different amounts of 
agricultural aid. From Table 8, among the countries that exhibit crop production 
breakthrough, 15 achieved the breakthrough because of yield improvement (named as 
Group A1). The agricultural aid amount that they received on average was USD 949 
million for each country and USD 2.95 per capita annually. Eight countries achieved the 
breakthrough due to area expansion (named as Group A2). They received on average 
USD 606 million for each country or USD 2.94 per capita annually. This indicates that 
although Group A1 received more agricultural aid than Group A2, it was caused by its 
larger population size. In a six years’ time frame, we can see that Group A1 received 
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more than two times the amount of total agricultural aid that Group A2 did, but the ratios 
on per capita aid received annually are much smaller. From 2001 to 2006, each year 
Group A2 got even more aid per capita than A1. This implies that population size played 
a critical role in determining the distribution of agricultural foreign aid between Group 
A1 and Group A2 countries. 
Annual agricultural GDP per capita growth among different groups is compared 
in Table 13. Countries in Group A have a significantly higher annual agricultural GDP 
per capita growth (2.74% higher) than countries in Group B. Countries in Group A are 
also those countries that received much more agricultural aid than countries in Group B. 
Also, countries that achieved yield breakthroughs (Group A1) have much higher 
agricultural GDP per capita growth (1.49% higher) than countries that achieved 
production breakthroughs via area expansion (Group A2).  
At the same time, the average agricultural GDP per capita from 1995 to 2011 is 
almost the same among Group A and B, showing that their agricultural development 
levels are similar. However, for one dollar of agricultural GDP value, Group A received 
0.036 dollar of agricultural aid, which was 1.39 times higher than Group B. Group A1 
had much higher value of agricultural GDP per capita per year, indicating higher 
agricultural development levels in countries that bring yield improvement. Group A1 
received 0.04 dollar of agricultural aid for every one dollar of agricultural GDP value, 
which was also higher than Group A2.  
Consider the extra amount of agricultural aid per dollar of agricultural GDP 
received by Group A related to Group B and Group A1 related to Group A2 annually, 
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this brief empirical comparison shows that agricultural foreign aid tend to go the 
countries that have higher Agricultural GDP, and brought faster agricultural GDP growth. 
Table 14 Comparison of Sub-category Agricultural Aid Received by Sub-Saharan 















Number of Countries 24 20 15 8 
Per Capita, ($) 
Ag R&E Aid  4.70 1.78 2.65 4.74 6.76 0.70 
Ag Dev Aid 13.80 5.63 2.45 14.60 17.66 0.83 
Ag Policy Aid  8.75 3.82 2.29 10.04 9.23 1.09 
Ag Input Aid  2.93 1.05 2.79 3.98 1.93 2.06 
Ag Water Aid  4.74 2.45 1.93 5.31 5.64 0.94 
Total (million 
$) 
Ag R&E Aid 2214 718 3.08 1344 836 1.61 
Ag Dev Aid 6502 2279 2.85 4139 2185 1.89 
Ag Policy Aid 4121 1544 2.67 2845 1142 2.49 
Ag Input Aid 1382 425 3.25 1129 239 4.73 




Dollar of Ag 
GDP 
Ag R&E Aid 2.95 1.62 1.83 2.80 3.61 0.78 
Ag Dev Aid 11.55 5.46 2.11 11.19 13.57 0.82 
Ag Policy Aid 6.90 3.75 1.84 7.93 5.42 1.46 
Ag Input Aid 2.10 1.61 1.30 2.44 1.67 1.46 
Ag Water Aid 3.18 1.94 1.64 3.75 2.39 1.57 
Source: World Bank (2013), OECD (2013)  
 
 
In Table 14, we compared the amount of agricultural aid that went to the major 
agricultural aid sub-categories we discussed in chapter 2. “Ag R&E Aid” stands for 
agricultural aid that went to research and extension, “Ag Dev Aid” stands for agricultural 
development aid that went to agricultural development and food production. From Table 
14 we can see that the highest priority categories are agricultural development and 
agricultural policy.  
From the perspective of total aid, Group A and Group A1 received more total aid 
in all sub-categories than Group B and Group A2 from 1995 to 2011, respectively. 
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Specifically, Group A and A1 received much more total aid to agricultural input compare 
with Group B (A/B ratio is 3.25) and A2 (A1/A2 ratio is 4.73). This might contribute to 
the yield improvement because of intensified input usage.  
From the perspective of per capita aid, Group A still received more aid per capita 
than Group B in all sub-categories, whereas per capita aid received by Group A2 
exceeded Group A1 in categories of agricultural R&E aid, agricultural development aid 
and agricultural water aid. From the perspective of aid received per thousand dollar of 
agricultural GDP, Group A received more aid per thousand dollar of agricultural GDP 
than Group B, and Group A1 received more than Group A2 only for some categories of 
aid.  
When comparing the row of aid received per capita with the row of aid received 
per thousand agricultural GDP dollars, there clearly appears to be some differences in the 
pattern of aid across these sub-categories. The A/B ratio and A1/A2 ratio in agricultural 
input aid category are lower in aid per thousand US dollar agricultural GDP row than the 
aid per capita row. It seems that some countries got lots of agricultural input aid that had 
a higher than average agricultural GDP.  Overall the per capita and agricultural GDP 
rows are not widely different, though there seem to be some distributional differences 
across sub-categories.   
 This variation of sub-category aid distribution, together with the USD 50 total 
agricultural aid per capita they both received over last 17 years, make it hard to 
distinguish the influence of agricultural aid over Group A1 and A2 on a per capita basis.  
Based on all the analysis above, we would conclude that agricultural foreign aid 
has a strong tendency to support countries that realized grain production breakthroughs 
 
91 
(Group A) relative to countries that did not (Group B). Agricultural foreign aid would 
also tend to support countries that achieved yield breakthrough (Group A1) more so than 
area breakthroughs (Group A2). Also, more agricultural foreign aid would have a positive 
impact on agricultural GDP growth. On a sub-category level, the most funded aid 
categories for four groups are agricultural development and agricultural policy. Group A 
received more aid (total, per capita and per $1000 Dollar of Ag GDP) than Group B in all 
sub-categories. Group A1 received more aid per capita than Group A2 in ag policy and ag 
input sectors. Group A1 received more aid per $1000 Dollar of Ag GDP than Group A2 
in ag policy, ag water and ag input sectors. 
5.2 How Foreign Aid Affects Grain Production Breakthroughs 
5.2.1 TFP Estimation 
Above we identified a positive correspondence between agricultural foreign aid 
and production breakthroughs. Based on this, we could further explore how foreign aid 
affects agricultural production. The first step is to estimate TFP for agricultural 
production in African countries. The second step will be to explain the relationship 
between TFP growth and foreign aid. 
According to Fuglie and Rada (2013), agricultural production growth can be 
achieved from area expansion, input intensification, and TFP growth. By definition, 
agricultural TFP measures the contribution of all factors beyond inputs that would affect 
agricultural production. We already know that since 2000 these countries achieved 
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production breakthrough via area harvested growth or yield breakthrough, and they 
received on average double the amount of aid than received by countries that did not 
realized a breakthrough. What remained unclear is whether TFP growth contributed to 
that production growth or not. So the hypotheses are now as follows: (3) TFP growth 
contributed to the production breakthrough after 2000, and (4) Agricultural foreign aid 
could affect agricultural production breakthrough by affecting TFP growth.  
To better evaluate the TFP growth rate in each group during the period of 
production breakthrough, we conduct a calculation using equation (2) discussed in the 
literature review chapter: 
ln?????? ?????
? ? = ln (??? ???? )? ? ??
?? ln?
????
????? ???                                        (2) 
On the left side, ????? is an estimated value of TFP for specific country c at time 
t. ????? is an estimated value of TFP for specific country c in 1990. Using 1990 as the 
base year, ????? is set to equal 100. 
On the right side of the equation, Y represents the agricultural output of African 
countries. The data we use are retrieved from the FAO STAT database (2013)1, 
containing aggregate “Grain” production which includes maize, millet, rice, sorghum and 
wheat as the five major crops mentioned above.   
The variables ????  represents production inputs j of country “c” at year “t”. Inputs 
j includes area harvested (five cereal crops only) (USDA, 2013), agricultural machinery 
1 Instead of using the USDA PSD database that we used earlier, here we use FAO database which includes 
more countries’ data (such as Namibia) to enlarge sample size. 
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in use (FAO, 2013), animal stocks in use (FAO, 2013), fertilizer usage ((metric tons 
N+P2O5+K2O N-equivalents from Fuglie and Rada(2013)) and total economically active 
population in agriculture (World Bank, 2013). Here we assume that each year fixed 
percentages of these inputs are used to produce these five cereal crops.  
???  is the estimated elasticity value of output with respect to each input variable. 
Here we apply Fuglie and Rada’s (2013) results directly, which is estimated using a 
random effects agricultural production model. Table 3 above is a presentation of the 
regression results from Fuglie and Rada (2013).  
These variables and coefficients covered all countries in Group A (A1 and A2) 
and 18 countries in Group B, except Eritrea and South Sudan. Data on total economically 
active population in agriculture are only available from 1980 to 2007. This limited the 
range of the whole calculation down to this period.  
Applying available data on X and Y and Fuglie and Rada’s coefficient estimations 
shown in Table 3 into the right hand side of equation (2), the annual TFP growth and TFP 
index on the left side can be calculated. Table 15 presents the results of selected year’s 
TFP index and growth rate (sorted by groups). 
Table 15 includes TFP indexes for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2007. It also shows the 
compound annual TFP growth rates between 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2007 at the 
country level. Group A countries are listed into four parts: Group A1, Group A2, Group 
A1 and A2 (breakthrough due to area expansion and yield improvement together) and 
Group A excluding A1 and A2 (no direct relationship can be observed between 
production breakthrough and other two factors). 
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Due to the large number of countries in each group, it becomes difficult to 
compare trends between different groups, so we also compared annual TFP growth rates 
at the group level to simplify the table. We apply the weighted average method to 
calculate Group A, Group B, Group A1 and Group A2’s overall TFP growth rates 
between certain time periods, using ten years as a typical interval. The weighted average 
methods uses the share (as shown in Table 13) of a country’s grain production quantity 
(from 1989 to 2012) over the entire group’s production quantity to measure the weight of 
an individual country in the group results that are presented in Table 16. This means that 
the more grain a country produced over the entire period, the more weight would be put 
on that country in the overall group TFP growth rate.   
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Table 15 TFP Index in 1980, 1990 and 2007, and Compound Annual Growth Rates (%). 
Group Country 
Annual TFP Index Compound Annual Growth  
1980 1990 2000 2007 1990-2000 2000-2007 
Group A1 
Angola 183.9 100 181.2 194.1 5.6 1.0 
Ethiopia 119.8 100 98.0 130.7 -0.2 4.2 
Guinea 76.0 100 107.8 114.0 0.7 0.8 
Madagascar 95.4 100 97.5 139.7 -0.2 5.3 
Malawi 108.2 100 158.0 158.0 4.2 0.0 
Mali 57.2 100 107.0 123.2 0.6 2.0 
Mozambique 88.1 100 131.9 138.9 2.5 0.7 
Namibia 75.5 100 115.0 97.7 1.3 -2.3 
Rwanda 132.6 100 96.3 88.6 -0.3 -1.2 
Senegal 76.2 100 81.5 64.6 -1.8 -3.3 
Sierra Leone 114.5 100 52.2 84.1 -5.7 7.1 
Uganda 79.5 100 85.9 92.7 -1.4 1.1 
Zambia 94.2 100 99.9 116.3 0.0 2.2 
Group 
A1 and A2 
Liberia 120.3 100 91.0 101.2 -0.9 1.5 
Swaziland 103.7 100 115.8 31.6 1.3 -16.9 
Group A2 
Botswana 87.9 100 38.8 59.8 -8.2 6.4 
Burkina Faso 103.4 100 109.5 119.5 0.8 1.3 
Burundi 79.6 100 102.5 96.8 0.2 -0.8 
Central 
African Rep. 140.9 100 182.6 246.2 5.6 4.4 
Gambia 77.2 100 156.0 89.7 4.1 -7.6 
Tanzania 111.9 100 84.9 118.0 -1.5 4.8 
Group A 
(excluding 
A1 and A2) 
Congo, DR 76.8 100 107.7 93.7 0.7 -2.0 
Kenya 105.4 100 90.6 113.5 -0.9 3.3 




Table 15 Continued 
Group Country Annual TFP Index Compound Annual Growth (%) 1980 1990 2000 2007 1990-2000 2000-2007 
Group 
B 
Benin 92.0 100 137.3 150.2 2.9 1.3 
Cameroon 122.5 100 143.5 226.7 3.3 6.7 
Cape Verde 93.3 100 126.6 20.7 2.2 -22.8 
Chad 119.7 100 102.5 140.7 0.2 4.6 
Comoros 96.5 100 95.6 97.2 -0.4 0.2 
Congo 283.2 100 112.4 438.6 1.1 21.5 
Côte d'Ivoire 91.7 100 90.5 94.2 -0.9 0.6 
Gabon 75.6 100 109.4 116.7 0.8 0.9 
Ghana 91.3 100 154.8 123.9 4.1 -3.1 
Lesotho 78.1 100 55.1 26.8 -5.3 -9.8 
Mauritius 44.9 100 54.2 80.2 -5.4 5.8 
Niger 84.4 100 67.3 102.8 -3.5 6.2 
Nigeria 53.3 100 93.0 106.5 -0.7 1.9 
Somalia 59.3 100 74.9 40.8 -2.6 -8.3 
South Africa 113.8 100 148.2 101.5 3.6 -5.3 
Sudan (former) 167.9 100 126.7 216.6 2.2 8.0 
Togo 82.8 100 106.1 113.4 0.5 0.9 
Zimbabwe 85.0 100 93.8 53.1 -0.6 -7.8 
Source: World Bank (2013), OECD (2013), estimated using Fuglie and Rada (2013) 
Table 16 Average Annual Agricultural TFP Growth Rates (%) over Different Periods 
 Period Group A 
Group 
B 





1 1980-2007 0.70 1.09 -0.39 0.87 0.35 0.52 
2 1990-2007 1.15 1.03 0.12  1.32 1.00 0.33 
3 1980-1990 -0.06 1.20 -1.25  0.10 -0.74 0.85 
4 1990-2000 0.33 1.50 -1.17 0.67 -0.25 0.91 
5 2000-2007 2.34 0.37 1.97 2.27 2.80 -0.53 
6 2000-2007(ex. Tanzania) 2.02 0.37 1.65  2.27 0.72 1.54 
Source: Author’s calculation. World Bank (2013), OECD (2013), estimated using Fuglie 




The first row of Table 16 provides an overview of the TFP growth rates in each 
group during the period 1980-2007. In this 30 year time frame, countries that we 
identified as having a production breakthroughs after 2000 (Group A) actually had 
smaller TFP growth rates compared with countries that did not have production 
breakthroughs (Group B). The reason for this is Group B had much higher TFP growth 
than Group A before 2000. During 1980-1990, Group B had a 1.2% compound annual 
TFP growth rate, whereas Group A had only a -0.06% compound annual TFP growth rate. 
During 1990-2000, Group B had 1.5% growth rate while Group A only had 0.33% 
growth rate. Group A only started to out-perform Group B in its TFP growth rate after 
2000, when Group A countries achieved production acceleration. The column “Delta” 
shows the difference in TFP growth rates between Group A and Group B. We can see 
that delta changed from negative in the 1980s and 1990s to positive in the 2000s as 
Group A countries experienced strong TFP growth (2.34%) after 2000. Thus, hypothesis 
(3) that TFP growth contributes to the production breakthrough is shown to be true. 
We can recall from Table 13 that the amount of aid Group A received has 
increased dramatically after 2000. So the agricultural foreign aid growth and TFP growth 
demonstrated a positive correlation. 
For Group A1 and Group A2, during the period between 1990 and 2007, Group 
A1 had a 0.87% TFP growth rate, whereas Group A2 had a 0.35% TFP growth rate. The 
TFP growth rate of Group A1 is always positive. It increases from 0.1% in the 1980s to 
2.77% in the 2000s. As we mentioned earlier, production equals to yield times area 
harvested, so the TFP growth contributed to production growth mainly through affecting 
yield improvement. Thus, this high TFP growth rate matches with the fact that Group A1 
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achieved production acceleration via yield improvement. On the contrary, Group A2 
experienced a long period of negative TFP growth from 1980 to 2000. Nevertheless, low 
or negative TFP growth would not affect grain production growth too much as Group A2 
consists of countries that rely more on area expansion to increase production. After 2000, 
we observe high TFP growth in Group A2 as well, mainly driven by Tanzania’s unusual 
TFP growth, and that it produced 50% of the grain in Group A2. If we take Tanzania out 
of Group A, the TFP growth for Group A will decreased to 2.02 and for Group A2 it will 
decrease to 0.72. Thus, we could conclude that generally Group A1 countries that had 
yield breakthroughs after 2000 would have higher TFP growth rates compared with 
Group A2 countries.  
For Tanzania, as we can see from Table 16, during the period 2000-2007 its TFP 
Index increased 4.8%. However, Tanzania has no yield breakthrough after 2000 and its 
production breakthrough was the results of area expansion.  
Tanzania serves as an example of the diversity in sub-Saharan Africa. Since by 
definition TFP takes into account all inputs for agricultural production, it is surprising 
that TFP growth didn’t synchronized with yield breakthrough in Tanzania. However, 
research on specific countries like Tanzania is beyond the scope of this paper. As we 
stated above, most of the sub-Saharan African countries that experience high TFP growth 
are countries that had yield improvement at the same time. If we omit Tanzania from our 
observation, we could reach a conclusion that TFP growth contributed to the production 
breakthrough that happened in sub-Saharan Africa after 2000 via yield improvement.  
Because agricultural foreign aid provides different forms of support to agriculture, 
such as financial support to agricultural inputs as we discussed earlier in Chapter 2, we 
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expect that agricultural foreign aid is one factor driving TFP. The question is whether 
agricultural foreign aid could affect agricultural production breakthrough by affecting 
TFP growth or not. Below we use regression methods to test hypothesis (4). 
 
5.2.2 Effectiveness of Agricultural Foreign Aid on Agricultural TFP growth 
Above we discussed methods to estimate agricultural TFP growth and calculated 
new, recent agricultural TFP growth rates using the best available data. Using these 
estimated parameters, we can further explore the relationship between foreign aid and 
TFP growth using the regression analysis presented below. 
The first regression models we used is a simple OLS model using panel data 
featuring 43 sub-Saharan African countries (c) during the period from 1996 to 2007. 
Based on reasons we discussed in the literature review chapter, the second regression 
model we used is a instrumental variable model to address the endogeneity of aid. We 
will first discuss the OLS model. 
Since agricultural TFP can be affected by many factors including agricultural 
foreign aid, the relationship between agricultural TFP and other factors might be treated 
as linear. This model can be described as: 
??(?????) = ???(?? ?????)  + ???? + ???                      (4) 
The independent variables that affect dependent variable agricultural TFP growth 
??(?????) include agricultural aid ??(?? ?????) and other variables ???. ? and ? are 
coefficients on independent variables, and ??? is the independent error term. Because we 
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are primarily concerned about the effectiveness of agricultural foreign aid, the 
agricultural aid variable is presented as a separate variable ??(?? ?????) in equation (4). 
To investigate how TFP growth was affected, we use Fuglie’s (2013) research as 
base and consider the following variables as determinants of:  
(1) ??(?? ?????) : Foreign aid to the agricultural sectors of sub-Saharan African 
countries: the value measured in log format and predicted using the dataset used in Table 
13 from OECD.  
(2) ?????: Farmer’s health, measured using data on the prevalence of HIV, as 
total % of the population (ages 15-49) from the World Bank (2013). In the study 
conducted by Dixon, McDonald, and Roberts (2002), they found that HIV/AIDS could 
reduce annual average national economic growth rates by 2-4% in sub-Saharan African 
countries. Here we use the prevalence of HIV as the health indicator. Because HIV might 
decrease the infected farmer’s working ability, thus reduce the available labor for 
agriculture, it eventually impacts agricultural productivity negatively. Besides this, 
although indicators of other health problems would have also impacted agricultural 
productivity, the prevalence of HIV data has the best data availability among all health 
indicators in World Bank database. 
 (3) ??(???)??: Government effectiveness is measured in percentile rank using 
data on governance index from World Bank (2010). The assumption is that effective 
government could stimulate agricultural productivity.  
(4) ???????????: Human Capital. It serves as an indicator to reflect the farmers’ 
contribution to agricultural TFP increases, and is measured by data on total average years 
of total schooling (age 15-19) from the Barro-Lee dataset (2010). 
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The OLS model Equation (4) can be expanded as: 
??(?????) = ???(?? ?????)  + ??????? + ????(???)?? + ????????????? + ???   (5) 
where ? and  ?? ? ?? are coefficients on independent variables.  
The results of OLS regressions are calculated using STATA and are listed in 
Table 17. 
 
Table 17 Determinants of Agricultural Total Factor Productivity Growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Using the OLS Regression Method. 
Ordinary Least-Squares 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) Ln(TFP) 







































Observations 516 504 503 372 372 
R2 0.031 0.055 0.037 0.0818 0.0613 
Note: Data is from 43 sub-Saharan African countries during 1996 to 2007. Each column 
has different amount of observations due to missing values in different variables. Z value 
is shown in parentheses. Significance test indicates ***p>0.99, ** p>0.95, *p>0.90. 
 
 
Column (1) to column (5) in Table 17 represents the results of OLS regressions 
using different combinations of the independent variables. Due to lack of coverage in 
country level data for average years of total schooling, the sample size changed 
dramatically in columns 4 and 5.  
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For the prevalence of HIV as an independent variable in the regression, we 
observe that it has a negative impact on TFP growth. The coefficients range from -0.0181 
to -0.0204 in column 2 to 5, so that for every one percent of population increase in 
infection with HIV, agricultural TFP will on average decrease by -1.9%.  
The impact of agricultural aid on TFP growth is indicated by coefficients ranging 
from 0.0071 to 0.0093 in column 1 to 5. All coefficients are insignificant, and R-squares 
are very small. These results suggest that aid has no effect on agricultural TFP growth. 
This result is similar to the study conducted by Burnside and Dollar (2000). However, as 
discussed earlier, OLS regression might not well explain the impact of foreign aid 
because of the endogeneity of foreign aid to growth, such that foreign aid might be 
correlated with the error term. Thus, we could see from nearly all recent aid effectiveness 
studies that the IV regression methods are used.  
In our case, because agricultural aid played the same role in improving 
agricultural TFP as general aid in general TFP growth, agricultural aid might also 
correlate with the error term. So we determined that the simple OLS regression here is 
unable to reveal any significant relationship between agricultural aid and agricultural TFP 
growth. So we will then use an IV regression to control for the possible endogeneity of 
aid and explore the factors that affect agricultural TFP growth. Thus, after we identify 
agricultural aid as an endogenous variable, we will use instrumental variables that are not 
correlated with the error term to deal with it.  
Despite the debate on instrumental variables discussed earlier, there is no 
conclusion on optimal instrumental variables or alternative estimation methods at this 
time. Because of this, the only feasible option is to continue using typical IV estimation 
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method and typically used instrumental variables. The goal is to explain how donors 
choose to allocate aid, which may also be related to ag production. 
In our case, because we are focusing on agricultural TFP growth instead of GDP 
growth, the typical lagged variable on agricultural aid becomes a dubious choice. It could 
take several years for past agricultural aid to take effect, which might affect then TFP 
growth in the recent year. Instead, we assume that agricultural aid committed is affected 
by the size of country’s agricultural sector. Also, we do not see any correlation between 
TFP growth and the size of country’s agricultural sector. For example, from Table 15 we 
can see a small country could have high TFP growth rate. The instrumental variables we 
are going to use to represent country size are agricultural population 
( ln (?? ????????????)) and area harvested (ln (???? ???????????)). These variables 
reflect a country’s size in agricultural sector better than general population and area, and 
we assume that agricultural aid is affected by this “agricultural” country size. The amount 
of agricultural population and area harvested should have no direct correlation with 
agricultural TFP growth except through aid, but might affect the amount of agricultural 
aid committed.  
We use the log value of agricultural population and log value of area harvested to 
build the first stage regression in which agricultural aid is the dependent variable. Thus, 
the first stage regression is shown as: 
Ln (?? ?????) = ??ln (?? ????????????) + ??ln (???? ???????????) + ???? + ???     (6) 
where ??? is the independent error term, ???represent other exogenous independent 
variables that affect TFP growth and ?s are their coefficients, and ?? and  ?? are 
coefficients for agricultural population and area harvested variables. For agricultural 
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population we used data from the FAO (2013). For area harvested we use the same data 
from USDA (2013). 
Using equation (6), we can estimate the determinants of ln (?? ?????). We then 
apply the predicted value Ln (?? ?????) from equation (6) to the model of TFP, which is 
the second stage least squares model. It is expanded as: 
Ln (?????) = ?Ln (?? ???)?? + ??????? + ????(???)?? + ????????????? + ???         (7) 
where ??? is the independent error term. ? and ? are the coefficients of the independent 




Table 18 Determinants of Agricultural Total Factor Productivity Growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa using an IV Regression Method. 
IV Regressions 
First Stage Regressions 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Ln(agricultural aid) 



































Constant -6.41*** (-9.43) 
-6.68*** 
(-9.46) 






Adjusted R2 0.2739 0.2774 0.3809 0.2592 0.3569 
Second Stage Instrumental Variables Regression 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Ln(TFP) 
















Governance Index   -0.006*** (-5.92)  
-0.007*** 
(-5.45) 
Schooling    0.027* (1.66) 
0.049*** 
(3.01) 









Observations 516 504 503 372 372 
DHW P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Note: Data is from 43 sub-Saharan African countries during 1996 to 2007. Each model 
has different amount of observations due to missing values in different variables. Z value 
is shown in parentheses. Significance test indicates ***p>0.99, ** p>0.95, *p>0.90.   
Instrumental variables: log ag population and log area harvested. The p-values of 
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) tests from column 1 to 5 are all near or equal to zero, 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that agricultural aid is exogenous.   
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In Table 18, the five columns represent five models that have different 
combinations of independent variables from Table 17. Column 2 includes the prevalence 
of HIV as an independent variable. Column 3 includes a governance index as an 
independent variable. Column 4 includes schooling as an independent variable. Column 5 
includes both a governance index and schooling as independent variables. The first stage 
regressions measure the factors affecting agricultural aid in sub-Saharan Africa. From 
first stage regressions we can see that all coefficients for Ln (Ag Population) and Ln 
(Area Harvested) are positive and significant, indicating that agricultural population and 
area harvested have significant positive effects on agricultural aid allocation. Also, the R-
squares in five columns are comparatively bigger than the OLS result. It all confirms that 
they are relevant instrumental variables for agricultural aid. 
The second stage regressions measure the factors affecting agricultural TFP 
growth including agricultural aid. From the second stage regressions we can see 
agricultural aid now has a significant and positive effect on TFP growth. This model is 
quite different from the OLS model. Considering column (1) to (5) together, on average 
agricultural TFP would increase 0.13% when agricultural aid increases by 1%.  
Other independent variables also impact TFP growth. Column (5) shows the 
regression results of a model with all independent variables in it.  
The prevalence of HIV has a negative effect on TFP growth, which will decrease 
agricultural TFP growth by 0.016% with a 1% increase in infected population. The OLS 
regressions had similar results; Table 17 showed that agricultural TFP growth will 
decrease by 0.02% with 1% increase in infected population. The prevalence of HIV will 
damage farmer’s health and make them unable to work. It will also bring a heavier 
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burden to the patient’s family. So it is reasonable that agricultural TFP growth is 
negatively affected by it. 
The impact of the governance index on TFP growth is surprisingly negative. A 1% 
increase in the governance index will decrease TFP growth by 0.007%. We believe that it 
is possible that a good government could affect agricultural productivity negatively. One 
possible explanation is that when sub-Saharan countries’ government effectiveness 
increases, it creates a better social environment that encourage the most skilled and 
ambitious people shift out of the agricultural sector for better living. Due to the low 
availability of skilled people in developing countries, it leaves fewer skilled people in 
agriculture, which will harm agricultural productivity as a consequence. 
Average years of total schooling have a significant and positive effect on TFP 
growth. Column (5) in Table 18 indicates that a 1 year increase in schooling for the total 
population would increase agricultural TFP by 4.9%. Average years of schooling will 
increase farmer’s knowledge, thus helping to increase TFP growth. 
In table 19 we also explore the relationship between agricultural aid and TFP 
growth using panel data IV regression methods. The (1) column and (2) column show the 
first and second stage regression results with fixed (1) or random (2) effects using the 
above independent variables, excluding schooling. The (3) column and (4) column show 
the first and second stage regression results with fixed (3) or random (4) effects using all 
independent variables that we used in Table 18. From column (1) and (3) we can see 
panel data IV regressions with fixed effects didn’t explain the relationship very well. 
Their coefficients on agricultural aid are not significant and R-squares are very low. This 
indicates that it is the variation across countries instead of variation within countries 
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across years that affected the impact of agricultural aid on production growth. On the 
other hand, columns (2) and (4) shows that agricultural aid coefficients are significant 
under panel data IV regressions with random effects. Combining columns (2) and (4) 
together, on average agricultural TFP would increase 0.112% when agricultural aid 
increases by 1%. This is very similar to the IV regression results from Table 18. At the 
same time, the prevalence of HIV still has a negative effect on TFP growth, like Table 
18’s results. It will decrease agricultural TFP growth by 0.018% with 1% increase in 
infected population. However, under the panel data IV regressions the governance index 
and schooling no longer have effects on TFP growth, because their coefficients are now 
insignificant.   
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Table 19 Determinants of Agricultural Total Factor Productivity Growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa using Panel Data IV Regression Methods with Random and Fixed Effects. 
Panel Data IV Regressions 
First Stage Regressions 







Dependent Variable Ln(agricultural aid) 

































Constant -38.91*** (-3.90) 
-10.85*** 
(-4.78) 




Adjusted R2 0.2805  0.2682  
Second Stage Instrumental Variables Regression 







Dependent Variable Ln(TFP) 





















Schooling   0.055 (0.72) 
-0.0068 
(-0.25) 
Constant 4.72*** (46.24) 
4.483*** 
(41.06) 




Overall R2 0.0000 0.0921 0.0150 0.0958 
Observations 503 503 372 372 
Note: Data is from 43 sub-Saharan African countries during 1996 to 2007. Each model 
has different amount of observations due to missing values in different variables. Z value 
is shown in parentheses. Significance test indicates ***p>0.99, ** p>0.95, *p>0.90. 





In this chapter, we first conducted quantitative analysis of agricultural foreign aid 
for four country groups. It turned out that agricultural foreign aid has a positive impact on 
agricultural GDP growth. Also, international agricultural foreign aid donors gave more to 
countries that achieved grain production breakthrough and countries that achieved it 
through yield improvement. Agricultural development and agricultural policy are the 
most funded aid categories. We then estimated agricultural TFP value and its annual 
growth rate for 43 sub-Saharan African countries. By comparing the TFP growth rates in 
groups, we found that Group A’s TFP growth rates were lower than Group B’s during 
1980-1990 and 1990-2000. It was not until 2000 when Group A has a higher TFP growth 
rate than Group B. At the same time, Group A1 had higher TFP growth rates than Group 
A2 because Group A2’s TFP growth rates were negative during 1980-1990 and 1990-
2000. But Group A1 and A2’s TFP growth rates could not match with Group B’s until 
the period of 2000-2007. During 2000-2007, Group A1’s TFP growth rate was higher 
than Group A2’s, but only if we exclude Tanzania.  
Second, we used OLS and IV regressions to evaluate the effects of agricultural aid 
on TFP growth. It turned out that OLS is not a meaningful way to estimate this effect. 
Instead, IV estimation is used to avoid an endogeneity issue. Agricultural population and 
area harvested served as instrumental variables for agricultural aid. The results of IV 
regressions and panel data IV regressions with random effects showed that agricultural 
aid has had significant and positive influence on TFP growth. We also found that the HIV 
infection rate had negative impacts on agricultural TFP growth. Under IV regressions, a 
governance index had negative impacts on agricultural TFP growth, whereas schooling 
has positive impacts on it. The negative impact of governance index is surprising, but we 
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offered a possible explanation by using the theory that better governance has shifted 
qualified labor force out of agriculture.  However, under the panel data IV regressions 
with random effects that governance index and schooling are not significant.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
For a long period of time, sub-Saharan African countries have been viewed as the 
most food insecure region in the world. Our discussions above have shown that their 
agricultural production growth relied on expanding harvested area, and underperformed 
their population growth before 2000. At the same time, international donors also 
contributed to the poor performance of agricultural production by not donating enough 
aid into agricultural sector. In fact, our data shows that the aid to agriculture was 
declining for sub-Saharan Africa before 2000. As the result, pessimism had risen and 
persisted for sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural production, and its food security, over past 
years. 
Since the beginning of the twenty first century, sub-Saharan African countries have faced 
multiple challenges related to agricultural supply and demand. On the demand side, food 
consumption increased due to increasing population and growing economies. On the 
supply side, the world food crisis generated high prices for commodities and agricultural 
inputs like fertilizer. The increased financial burden made the sub-Saharan African 
countries import less than before, thereby putting them under the threat of insufficient 
food supply. Moreover, we observed low aid commitments to the agricultural sectors 
before 2000. It was not until 2005 that the priority of foreign aid had finally shifted back 
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toward agriculture, with the share of aid to agricultural increasing from 3.2% in 2005 to 
5.2% in 2009. Despite all these challenges, many sub-Saharan countries successfully 
accelerated their agricultural production. From 1989 to 2002, Africa’s grain production 
only increased 28.9%, but this long-standing constraint on production was relaxed via 
various approaches after 2000. From 2002 to 2012 agricultural production in sub Saharan 
Africa increased 45%.  
In this paper, we confirmed existence of the production breakthroughs (hypothesis 
1) and analyzed their underlying explanations. We also confirmed the positive impact of 
foreign aid on these accelerating trends (hypothesis 2). The first hypothesis asserted that 
production breakthroughs occurred in many sub-Saharan African countries after 2000. 
This hypothesis is tested in Chapter 4, with the help of a piecewise linear regression 
model. We found that 24 out of 44 sub-Saharan African countries experienced production 
breakthroughs after 2000 (Group A). Among them, 15 countries had such breakthroughs 
due to breakthroughs in yield improvement (Group A1), while 8 countries due to 
breakthrough of harvested area expansion (Group A2). 19 other countries that did not 
have breakthroughs are classified into a separate group (Group B). 
Based on the results of breakpoint year and group classification, we conducted a 
series of analyses in the remainder of Chapter 4. We developed a distribution map which 
suggested that geographical factors might have also contributed to the production 
breakthroughs, because nearby countries tended to fall into the same group (Figure 13). 
These countries even tend to have adjacent years of breakthrough (Figure 14). 
We further explored the effects of production breakthroughs on African countries’ 
supply-use balance. Figure 15 showed different groups’ grain production, consumption 
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and percentage of imports in total supply. We found that rising domestic consumption 
forced most African countries to stop exporting grains and to rely more on imports to 
meet the demands of their growing populations and rising income. Due to Group A 
countries’ successful production breakthroughs, they managed to stabilize their import 
share for grains at 16% of total supply in the most recent decade. Group B’s import 
dependency continued to increase to 23% in 2013. For Group A1 and A2, we found that 
Group A1’s dependency on imports is higher than Group A2. We also noticed that grain 
production growth suspended again after the year of world food crisis, at about 2010. 
In the last part of Chapter 4 we argued that fertilizer played an important role in 
stimulating production acceleration. Figure 16 showed that Group A used more fertilizer 
than Group B when its production started to accelerate. More specifically it is Group A1 
that consumed most of the extra fertilizer to improve its yield. However, fertilizer use 
was sensitive to world fertilizer price changes. Its use declined after fertilizer prices 
climbed during the world food crisis. At the same time, we observed production growth 
has stopped after 2010. Despite the effects from natural disasters including drought and 
flood over the period, this implies that the production breakthroughs in Group A1 or even 
Group A are vulnerable partially due to their dependence on yield improvement, and on 
fertilizer costs. 
The second hypothesis suggested that agricultural foreign aid had impacted the 
observed production breakthroughs in sub-Saharan African countries. This hypothesis is 
tested in Chapter 5 using both quantitative comparison methods and regression analysis 
methods. In Table 13, we compared Group A, B, A1 and A2’s total agricultural aid 
received and agricultural GDP. We found that, on both per capita and total bases, Group 
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A received more agricultural foreign aid than Group B, and Group A1 received more 
agricultural foreign aid than Group A2. Group A’s average agricultural aid received per 
dollar of agricultural GDP per year is higher than Group B’s, and Group A1’s is higher 
than Group A2’s only for agricultural policy and agricultural input categories of aid. 
Moreover, Group A and A1 have higher agricultural GDP growth rates than Group B and 
A2, so that higher agricultural foreign aid tended to correspond with higher agricultural 
GDP growth.  This trend stayed true for sub-categories of agricultural aid in Table 14. 
We found that aid to agricultural development and agricultural policy were the two most 
funded aid sub-categories in each group, but distributional patterns are slightly different 
under a per capita perspective versus per dollar of agricultural GDP. 
 In Chapter 5.2, we estimated each sub-Saharan country’s annual total factor 
productivity (TFP) index using Fuglie and Rada’s (2013) method. Then we compared the 
TFP growth rates of country groups. Table 16 showed Group A, B, A1 and A2’s TFP 
growth rates over different periods. TFP growth rates between groups are different. 
Group A countries after 2000 displayed higher TFP growth rates than Group B countries. 
More especially, in Group A, Group A1 had higher TFP growth rates than Group A2.  
Two regression models were then employed to explore the relationship between 
agricultural aid and agricultural TFP growth. We first applied a simple OLS model and 
found that it was not able to produce any meaningful results, probably due to endogeneity 
of foreign aid with TFP growth. So instead we used an IV regression model and a panel 
data IV regression with random effects model to address this problem and successfully 
drew conclusions from these regressions. 
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As shown in Table 18 and 19, we found that agricultural foreign aid had a positive 
impact on agricultural TFP growth. On average, agricultural TFP would increase by 0.13% 
when agricultural aid increased by 1%. Thus, we concluded that agricultural foreign aid 
has recently been a positive motivator for agricultural production growth in sub-Saharan 
African countries. In addition, other factors (prevalence of HIV, good government and 
year of education) also influenced TFP growth. 
In summary, our results show that agricultural production breakthroughs occurred 
in 24 of the sub-Saharan African countries after 2000, leading to a continent wide 
improvement. These were caused by yield improvement of 15 sub-Saharan countries and 
area expansion of other 8 sub-Saharan countries. Foreign aid was shown to have assisted 
in that improvement.  
The method of classifying sub-Saharan African countries into different groups 
helped explained the dynamics of agriculture in many ways. We identified the group of 
countries that will accomplish promising growth if more resources were invested from 
both outside donors and their own authorities. These country groups deserve attention 
because of their proven production breakthroughs in the past. On the other hand, 
countries in Group B, which include large countries such as South Africa and Nigeria, are 
either problematic on stimulating production growth or ran out of growth potential with 
current growth strategies. These countries are also in need of foreign aid to help them 
grow and to smooth the discrepancy across countries, so that the welfare of entire sub-
Saharan Africa could increase simultaneously.  
In the past few years, many studies had shown conflicting results on aid 
effectiveness. Our study, like studies conducted by IEG (2011) and Umbadda (2013), 
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shows that agricultural foreign aid is useful in boosting agricultural production in sub-
Saharan Africa. Higher aid levels are observed in countries that were successful. We 
found a positive correlation between aid and TFP growth. Aid also helps countries to 
lower their dependency on imports. Thus, the international donors are playing important 
roles in helping sub-Saharan Africa feed itself. The total flow of agricultural aid should 
definitely increase, and more emphasis could be put on improving agricultural yields in 
recipient countries. Agricultural research has proven to be a promising category to which 
to donate, but more research is called for to better understand the impact of sub-
categories of agricultural aid on sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural production. 
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